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Accommodation of Religion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics

Michael W. McConnell*

Introduction
For decades conflicts over the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment were mired in slogans and multipart tests that could be
manipulated to reach almost any result. More recently, the
Supreme Court has moved to bring greater clarity (leave for the moment whether it has brought greater wisdom) to this confusing area
of the law. This movement has been explicit in the case of the Free
Exercise Clause, where the Court has jettisoned balancing and
adopted a position of formal neutrality toward religion.' Currently,
under the Free Exercise Clause, the government has met its obligations if it has pursued its secular policies without reference or regard to religion-even if the exercise of a religion is thereby
seriously disadvantaged, or even destroyed.2 This movement has
been only implicit in the case of the Establishment Clause, where
the Court still purports to follow its ambiguous three-part "Lemon
test."'3 But it is increasingly evident that the Lemon test is largely
*
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1. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988) (upholding government action that the Court admitted would "have devastating
effects on" a minority religion).

3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.'" (citations omitted)).
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irrelevant or indeterminate when applied to most serious establishment issues. A new, much less ambiguous, test has effectively replaced Lemon, though the Court has continued to be coy about the
4
change of doctrine.
The central questions under the Religion Clauses have come to
be framed in terms of "accommodation" of religion, which even
critics now call "the central motif of religion clause thought." 5
Accommodation refers to government laws or policies that have the
purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or facilitating the exercise of, a person's or an institution's religion. The key difference
between legitimate accommodation and impermissible "establishment" is that the former merely removes obstacles to the exercise of
a religious conviction adopted for reasons independent of the government's action, while the latter creates an incentive or inducement
(in the strong form, a compulsion) to adopt that practice or conviction. Within the term accommodation, I include both constitutionally compelled, or "free exercise" accommodations (those required
by the Free Exercise Clause), and legislative, or "discretionary" accommodations (those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but
6
nonetheless permitted by the Establishment Clause).
Accommodations can take the form of either negative rights or
positive rights, though the circumstances surrounding each are distinct. Negative rights arise whenever government action threatens
to interfere with the exercise of religion. Accommodation, in this
context, consists of exemption: it is the right to be left alone. Examples include the freedom of churches to reconfigure their places
of worship without interference from landmark commissions, or the
freedom of a member of the Native American Church to ingest peyote at a religious ceremony. Positive rights arise in two contexts:
(1) when the government has extended benefits or services to parallel secular concerns, and (2) when the government has taken other
action that puts religion at a disadvantage. Examples of the first
context include the extension of jobless benefits to persons unemployed for religious reasons when the government extends comparable benefits to persons unemployed for various secular reasons, 7
4. See infra notes 35-96 and accompanying text.
5. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 556 (1991).
6. This terminology differs from that used by Professor Lupu in Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause. Id. Lupu confines the term "accommodation" to accommodations
that "are not required by the Free Exercise Clause or any other provision of the Constitution." Id. at 559; see also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 743 (1992). This seems an unnecessary and inconvenient limitation on the ordinary usage of the term. It is more common to treat accommodation as comprising both
"mandatory" or "constitutionally compelled" accommodations (also sometimes called
"free exercise accommodations") and "legislative" or "discretionary" accommodations.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-5, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988)
(organizing the discussion according to "Forbidden, Permissible, and Required Accommodation"). Nothing of substance turns on the difference in terminology.
7. As explained in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136,
148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 n.17
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)), for a state to regard " 'religious claims less
favorably than other claims' " is to subject "religious observers [to] unequal treatment."
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and protection of individuals from private discrimination on the basis of religion when it protects individuals from private discrimination on various secular grounds. Examples of the second context
include providing released time programs or moments of silence
when compulsory schooling disrupts what would otherwise be opportunities for private religious practice, 8 or providing military
chaplains when military service takes soldiers away from their home
churches. As in other fields of constitutional law, 9 there is no legitimate claim for accommodation when the obstacles to religious exercise are not caused by the government and the failure of the
government to accommodate would not constitute unequal
treatment, o
I must stress at the outset that this Article's conception of accommodation does not include government action that acknowledges or
expresses the prevailing religious sentiments of the community,
such as the display of a religious symbol on public property or the
delivery of a prayer at public ceremonial events. Such acknowledgements do not leave the decision about religious practice to the individual or group, but rather serve as a social or collective expression
of religious ideas. Some Justices of the Supreme Court have used
the term accommodation to describe these symbolic actions,"1 but
the arguments in this Article have no application to them. Whether
government expression of religious sentiments is legitimate is be12
yond the scope of this Article.
The issue of accommodation arises under both Religion Clauses.
Under the Free Exercise Clause, the question is when (or whether)
accommodations are constitutionally compelled. Under the Establishment Clause, the question is when (or whether) accommodations
are constitutionally permitted. The Supreme Court's current position is that accommodations are not required under the Free Exercise Clause (with minor exceptions), but are permissible under the
Establishment Clause. The accommodationist position, which I defend here, holds that accommodations are sometimes required and,
8. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (striking down moment of silence law, but suggesting that some such provisions, enacted with proper intent, would
be constitutional); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released time
program).
9. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(rejecting the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative obligation
on the government to protect a citizen's interests from invasion by private parties).
10. I do not claim that these lines are clear or easily administered, but the analysis
is comparable to that governing positive rights in other constitutional contexts. See
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
11. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659, 663, 679 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
12. I discuss the "symbolic" issues in Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 187-94 (1992).
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within rigorous limitations defined below, are always permitted.
That does not mean, of course, that every benefit to religion masquerading as an accommodation is constitutional, but it does mean
that the principle of accommodation, when properly applied, is consistent with the requirements of the Religion Clauses. Thus, I oppose the Court's current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
and defend the Court's emerging jurisprudence of accommodation
under the Establishment Clause (with some qualifications and
modifications). 13
This Article has two purposes. First, it explains and discusses the
Supreme Court's doctrinal framework for analyzing cases involving
accommodation of religion as it has developed since 1985.14 Second, it responds to the principal academic arguments against accommodation that have appeared in recent years. Before turning to
those issues, I briefly restate the affirmative case for
accommodation.
I.

A Brief Restatement of the Affirmative Casefor Accommodation

Accommodations of religion are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not for the purpose of promoting
the government's own favored form of religion, but of allowing individuals and groups to exercise their religion-whatever it may bewithout hindrance. As Justice Brennan has explained, the "government [may] take religion into account.., to exempt, when possible,
from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." 15
Accommodation must be distinguished from the establishment of
religion, which is government action designed to promote, channel,
or direct religious exercise in socially-preferred ways. The hallmark
of accommodation is that the individual or group decides for itself
whether to engage in a religious practice, or what practice to engage
in, on grounds independent of the governmental action. The government simply facilitates ("accommodates") the decision of the individual or group; it does not induce or direct, by means of either
incentives or compulsion. The hallmark of establishment is that the
government uses its authority and resources to support one religion
over another, or religion over nonreligion. Much of the argument
over accommodation is based on a failure to perceive the fundamental difference between these two postures toward religion.
13. This does not mean, of course, that I agree with other aspects of the Court's
establishment jurisprudence. For a critical appraisal of current doctrine, see id.
14. This will provide an opportunity for me to revisit some of the issues raised in
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, in light of recent
opinions.
15. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted).
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Accommodation must also be distinguished from the idea of "formal neutrality"-the view that the government should base public
policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the religious consequences of its actions. The debate between accommodation and formal neutrality comes down to a question of means: Is
the freedom of religion best achieved when the government is conscious of the effects of its action on the various religious practices of
its people, and seeks to minimize interferences with those practices?
Or is it best advanced through a policy of "religion blindness"keeping government aloof from religious practices and issues? An
accommodationist believes that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom (even
though this requires the government to make sometimes difficult
and controversial judgments about the nature and strength of religious claims). An opponent of accommodation believes that it is
good public policy, and indeed constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise.
Two simple examples will make the difference between accommodation and formal neutrality clear. If the government were to pass a
law prohibiting any person facing personal bankruptcy from making
contributions to a church, the law would be an infringement on the
right of free exercise under both approaches because it would single
out religion for burdensome treatment not visited upon other interests (bankrupts are permitted to make other contributions and expenditures).' 6 If the government were to outlaw all consumption of
alcoholic beverages, thereby making religious ceremonials in some
Christian and Jewish traditions unlawful, this action would constitute a free exercise violation under the accommodationist view, because its effect would be to outlaw a religious practice. But it would
not constitute a free exercise violation under the formal neutrality
approach, because the law is generally applicable and was not
passed for the purpose of suppressing religion. There are countless
examples of government actions of this second sort and very few of
the first. The difference between the two views is the difference between a Free Exercise Clause that is a major restraining device on
government action that affects religious practice and a Free Exercise
Clause that will rarely have practical application.
I have made the affirmative arguments for accommodations elsewhere and will present only a summary here.17 The affirmative case
16. Whether there is a sufficient governmental justification is another question.
17. For fuller treatment, see McConnell, supra note 14; Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]; Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under The Religion
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is based on several related propositions.
First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with
the language of the First Amendment.1 8 The Religion Clauses contain two parallel provisions, both specifically directed at "religion."
The government may not "establish" 1 9 religion and it may not
"prohibit" religion. Taken together, the Religion Clauses can be
read most plausibly as warding off two equal and opposite threats to
religious freedom-government action that promotes the majority's
favored brand of religion and government action that impedes religious practices not favored by the majority. 20 The requirements are
substantive, not formal, because the concern of the Religion Clauses
is with the preservation of the autonomy of religious life, not (just)
with the process value of ensuring that government does not act on
21
the basis of religious bias.
Terms like "establish" and "prohibit" can be interpreted narrowly, as applying only to direct government compulsion, or
broadly, as applying also to disadvantageous treatment in the allocation of government "benefits." In keeping with the expansion of
constitutional rights under the rubric of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," which I consider necessary to preserve the conditions of personal liberty under the circumstances of the welfareregulatory state, 22 I endorse the broad interpretation. The government "establishes" or "prohibits" religion when it structures government benefits in such a way as to create incentives or
disincentives to religious practice, or to redistribute wealth along
lines defined by religious practice, just as it does through the re23
quirements and prohibitions of criminal law.
Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Neutrality]. On the historical issues, see Michael W. McConnell, The Originsand HistoricalUnderstandingof FreeExercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
18. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. The text states the "Congress" may make no law "respecting an establishment"
of religion, which meant that Congress could neither establish a national church nor
interfere with the establishment of state churches as they then existed in the various
states. After the last disestablishment in 1833 and the incorporation of the First Amendment against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, this "federalism" aspect of
the Amendment has lost its significance, and the Clause can be read as forbidding the
government to establish religion. For arguments that the federalism aspect of the Establishment Clause should be reinvigorated, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-62 (1991); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the
Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191
(1990); see also Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, StructuralFree Exercise, 90 MIcH. L.
REV. 477, 479-92 (1991) (arguing that the Court failed to appreciate the profound implications of incorporating the Religion Clauses against the states).
20. I use the expression "majority" to signify elements within the population who
enjoy political power, whether or not they are a numerical majority.
21. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17.
22. For a fuller explanation, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem:
Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1046-50 (1991) [hereinafter McConnell, Selective Funding]; Michael W. McConnell, UnconstitutionalConditions: Unrecognized Implicationsfor the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989) [hereinafter
McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions].
23. See McConnell, supra note 12.
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The alternative construction of the Religion Clauses-that they
guarantee formal, not substantive, neutrality-is considerably less
probable as a linguistic proposition. The command of the Religion
Clauses, according to this view, is that government may not "single
out" religion for special treatment, whether favorable or unfavorable. 24 This treats the Religion Clauses as specialized equal protection provisions (interpreted according to intent rather than effects),
rather than as substantive protections for a particular liberty. It interprets the Religion Clauses as allowing the government to do
whatever it wishes to or for religion, provided it does the same to or
for comparable secular entities and beliefs. If the government prohibits all alcoholic consumption by minors, for example, it can prohibit minors from taking part in communion; if government
prohibits all employers from discriminating on the basis of sex, it
can put an end to the all-male priesthood. Paradoxically, this view
would make the Religion Clauses violate the Religion Clauses, since
the Religion Clauses "single out" religion by name for special protections.2 5 There would have to be powerful reasons for adopting
so unlikely a construction of the words.
Second, the accommodationist position also best achieves the
purposes of the First Amendment. Formal neutrality confines the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause to persecution or overt discrimination against religion. But there is no reason to believe that
the First Amendment conception of religious freedom is so narrow.
Just as the Establishment Clause is more than a ban on a compulsory official church, the Free Exercise Clause is more than a ban on
the Inquisition. One of the few comments in the First Congress on
what would become the Free Exercise Clause was Daniel Carroll's
remark that the "rights of conscience ...will little bear the gentlest
touch of governmental hand"-not an apt description of a provision
24. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962).
25. The drafting history of the Free Exercise Clause further supports the accommodationist interpretation. Madison's original draft provided that "[t]he civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship," 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (Joseph Gales ed., Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1834) (June 8, 1789), and
that the "full and equal rights of conscience" should not "be in any manner, nor on any
pretext, infringed," 1 id. The first part speaks in terms of formal neutrality; civil rights
may not be abridged "on account of religious belief or worship." This is classic nondiscrimination language. The second part is accommodationist; it prohibits the infringement of conscience "on any pretext"-that is, for any reason. Legislative motive or
intent is irrelevant; the effect is all that matters. The select committee abbreviated
Madison's draft to read: "nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." 1 id. at
757 (Aug. 15, 1789). In effect, the select committee dropped the first part of Madison's
draft (the nondiscrimination language) and kept the second. If the framers had been
concerned about formal neutrality rather than the substantive liberty, they would have
retained the first part and dropped the second (Later, the text was further changed to
substitute the "free exercise of religion" for the "equal rights of conscience;" but that
change does not seem to affect this point.).

1992]

confined to persecution or deliberate discrimination.2 6 The principle underlying the First Amendment is that the freedom to carry out
one's duties to God is an inalienable right, 27 not one dependent on
28
the grace of the legislature.
Accomplishment of this purpose requires more than the "religion
blindness" prescribed by advocates of formal neutrality. Government is too pervasive-it touches too much-for a strategy of formal
neutrality to work. When the sphere of government action is small,
it is possible for government to ignore religion in most cases. The
"watchman state" rarely imposes burdens on religious practice, and
when it does so, the government interest will almost always be compelling. But when the government extends its reach to a wide variety of social objectives, including the direct regulation of churches
(through zoning laws, employment laws, taxes, discrimination laws,
licensing requirements, educational accreditation laws, and other
"generally applicable" laws), the conflicts with religious practice become frequent and intense. Laws that are appropriate for secular
entities are sometimes inappropriate for religious entities-at least
if we believe that religious entities have a protected right to define
and carry out their religious missions in accordance with their various religious beliefs. Under conditions of the modem welfare-regulatory state, benign neglect ceases to be benign.
The same can be true of other preferred freedoms, such as the
freedoms of speech or press, but the problem is most acute for the
free exercise of religion. Speech can be threatened by generally applicable laws; but in most instances, there are alternative channels of
communication that will allow the speaker to convey his message.
O'Brien may have been forbidden to bum his draft card, but he
could still denounce the draft. 29 By contrast, when a member of the
Native American Church is forbidden to ingest peyote, he has no
alternative means for practicing his religion. Generally applicable
laws can have a far more serious effect on religious freedom than on
any other constitutional right.
If we want to have both an activist state and religious freedom, it
is not enough to say that religious institutions and religiously motivated individuals must be treated the same way as comparable secular institutions and individuals. The effect of applying secular
norms to religious entities is simply not the same as applying those
norms to secular entities. The government must make special provision to preserve a degree of independence for religion, unless religion is to become-like secular entities-subject to pervasive
26. 1 id. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
27. On the recognition of religious freedom as an inalienable right, see McConnell,
Origins, supra note 17, at 1456 & n.238.
28. Of course, the right is limited by the rights of others, including the public right
of peace and good order, as was well recognized at the time. McConnell, Or/gns, supra
note 17, at 1461-66. This necessary limitation, however, does not detract from the fact
that the free exercise of religion was envisioned as a substantive right and not merely a
privilege against discriminatory legislation.
29. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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regulation by majoritarian institutions. Formal neutrality would
deny this special status.
In its weak form, the doctrine of formal neutrality leaves protection of religious freedom to legislative grace. In its strong form,
formal neutrality imposes a requirement of mandatory indifference
to the impact of government action on the religious lives of the people. The objectives of the Religion Clauses cannot fully be achieved
in this way. It is good to protect against persecution and overt discrimination; but under the conditions of the welfare-regulatory
state, it is necessary to do more-to take deliberate action to preserve the autonomy of religious life.
Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable
effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference,
as well as overt hostility. Because laws in a democratic republic inevitably are based on the presuppositions of the majority, they will
not infrequently conflict with the religious scruples of those holding
different world views, even in the absence of a deliberate intent to
interfere with religious practice. Sometimes this effect is unavoidable as a practical matter, since some laws are so necessary to the
common good that exceptions would be intolerable. But in other
instances the injury to religious conscience is so great, and the advancement of public purposes so small, that only indifference or
hostility could explain a refusal to make exemptions. Because of the
pluralist traditions of this country, legislators and executive officials
frequently are willing to make such exemptions when the need is
brought to their attention. But this may not-be the case when the
religious position is either unknown at the time of enactment or is
for some reason unpopular. A constitutional interpretation that allows accommodations thus prevents needless injury to the religious
consciences of those who can attract the solicitude of the legislature.
A constitutional interpretation that requires accommodations extends
this treatment to religious faiths less able to protect themselves in
the political arena.
Fourth, the historical record amply demonstrates that, in the years
preceding adoption of the First Amendment, the colonies, states,
and Continental Congress enacted religious exemptions and viewed
them as necessary for protection of the rights of conscience. There
is no substantial evidence that anyone at the time of the Framing
viewed such accommodations as illegitimate, in principle. At a minimum, the message of history is that religious accommodations are
30
permissible and desirable, even if not constitutionally compelled.
30. For a summary of the evidence, see McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 146673. Even opponents of accommodation generally recognize this fact. See Ellis West, The
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Would the principle of free exercise of religion at the time of the
Framing have been understood to require accommodations? The
best evidence, the wording of the various state constitutions, supports the accommodationist position;3 1 but the issue is not beyond
doubt. Changes in circumstances subsequent to 1791, however,
make the accommodationist position more compelling. As noted
above, accommodation becomes increasingly necessary as government assumes a wider and more intrusive role in society. In 1791, it
was generally true that religion would be free so long as the government did not undertake special efforts to interfere with it. Today,
the protection of religious freedom requires more than mere disregard. If the original level of religious freedom is to be preserved, it
is necessary to carve out special protections for spheres of life that
were not intended to be subject to government regulation and
control.
Perhaps the strongest affirmative argument for accommodation is
not theoretical but practical: In the absence of accommodations or
exemptions, many otherwise beneficial laws would interfere severely
with religious freedom. Employment discrimination laws conflict
with the Roman Catholic male priesthood; laws against serving alcoholic beverages to minors conflict with the celebration of communion; regulations requiring hard hats in construction areas can
effectively exclude Amish and Sikhs from the workplace; practices of
public hospitals can conflict with the religious scruples of doctors
and nurses in such matters as euthanasia and abortion; zoning laws
interfere with religious ministries; laws requiring jury service conflict with the tenets ofJehovah's Witnesses; laws giving historic preservation commissions authority over changes in old buildings, if
applied to churches, can result in official second-guessing of ecclesiastical decisions; and laws establishing the schedule of compulsory
public schools conflict with the prayer requirements of Muslim students. Exemptions from such laws are easy to craft and administer,
and do much to promote religious freedom at little cost to public
policy. If there were no accommodations, the underlying legislation
would become much more controversial and difficult to enact. Accommodations are a commonsensical way to deal with the differing
needs and beliefs of the various faiths in a pluralistic nation.
Case Against a Right to Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
591, 635 (1990).
31. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1455-63. The most common form of
the state constitutional protections was (in various words): "All persons whatever shall

have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and
safety of the State." GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES

377, 383 (Benjamin P. Poore ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1878). I
interpret these provisions to mean that government may interfere with the practice of
religion only when necessary to protect the public "peace and safety"-a concept I take
to be roughly analogous to the modern "compelling governmental purpose." As
Madison put the point, the rights of free exercise should prevail "in every case where it
does not trespass on private rights or the public peace." Letter from James Madison to
Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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II.

The Current Status of Accommodations in
Supreme Court Doctrine

As already noted, accommodation of religion is governed byjudicial interpretations of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 3 2 One might expect that these two provisions,
which form a single grammatical unit and reflect a common history,
would be interpreted complementarily. This rarely has been true.
Until recently, the Free Exercise Clause was interpreted in a manner
favorable to accommodation, 3 3 while the Establishment Clause was
interpreted to create obstacles to accommodation. 3 4 This led to a
jurisprudence in which judicial discretion was maximized and the
results appeared to be at war with one another. The current trend
in the Court is the reverse: The Free Exercise Clause no longer is
32. See supra text accompanying note 13.
33. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (requiring state to provide unemployment compensation for a person discharged for compliance with religious obligations inconsistent with work requirements); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that a person discharged because she could not work on the Sabbath because of religion was entitled to
unemployment compensation); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (requiring
state to provide unemployment compensation benefits for a person who terminated his
work because it was forbidden by his religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(requiring state to exempt Amish from requirement of attending school after the eighth
grade); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (requiring city to exempt
religious colporteurs from tax on door-to-door salesmen); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) (requiring municipal ordinance to exempt religious colporteurs from
license tax); see also Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (affirming by an equally
divided Court a decision requiring the state to exempt religious objector from requirement of a photographic driver's license); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
(construing National Labor Relations Act narrowly to avoid conflict with the church's
free exercise rights). Justice Scalia, a critic of free exercise exemptions, stated in 1989
that the Court had "held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required
religious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-specific exemptions from
otherwise applicable laws." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down
law requiring employers to accommodate sabbath observances of employees); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down statute providing moment of silence for
prayer or meditation in the public schools); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977) (interpreting Title VII's religious accommodation provisions extremely narrowly, apparently to avoid supposed Establishment Clause problems); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (interpreting draft exemption statute broadly, to avoid supposed Establishment Clause problems with an exemption limited to religious conscientious objectors); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(holding that public school programs that enable religious groups to give instruction in
public buildings violate the First Amendment). The Court's posture toward legislative
accommodation was not, however, unremittingly hostile. See Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding draft exemption limited to religious objectors); Arlan's
Dep't Store, Inc. v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing challenge to religionspecific exemption to Sunday closing law for want of a substantial federal question);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding public school released time
program).
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interpreted to require accommodation in most instances, but the Establishment Clause no longer is interpreted to interfere with them,
in most instances. This leads to a jurisprudence in which legislative
discretion is maximized and the Clauses, since they are rarely applied, rarely conflict.
The constitutional doctrine of accommodation of religion has
thus undergone significant transformation in the past five years.
The purpose of this Section is to set forth and explain the Court's
current approach to both the free exercise and the establishment
issues. The discussion will be divided into three parts: (a) a summary and analysis of recent decisions, (b) an analysis of the Establishment Clause test now employed in accommodation cases, and (c)
an analysis of the boundary between mandatory and permissible
accommodation.
A.

Recent Accommodation Cases

The principal recent case interpreting the Free Exercise Clause is
Employment Division v. Smith, 3 5 in which the Court held that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate." 36 The opinion suggests certain exceptions to the rule,
which on their face appear to be potentially expansive, but it seems
probable that these exceptions were mentioned for the purpose of
distinguishing disfavored precedents and will not survive to do serious work. 37 On the other hand, in some areas of law the need for
religious exemptions seems so compelling that it is hard to believe
courts will not begin to fashion exceptions. For example, it is difficult to believe that courts will be permitted to interfere with the selection of ecclesiastical officers, as would seem to be required by
Title VII.38 Either doctrine or reality must give. Nonetheless, in
the foreseeable future, it appears that the Free Exercise Clause of
the Federal Constitution will not be interpreted to require
accommodations.
Recent decisions regarding Establishment Clause challenges to
religion-specific accommodations likewise suggest a change in doctrine, this time favoring accommodations. In Corporationof the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 3 9 the
Court, in a decision unanimous in result, for the first time upheld
the constitutionality of a statute that explicitly exempted only religious organizations from its scope. The Court noted that "it is a
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 878-79.
See id. at 877-78.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1988).
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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carry out their religious missions." ' 40 That the accommodation "singles out religious entities for a benefit" did not concern the Court:
"Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting
a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason
to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities. ' 41 In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 4 2 the Court struck
down a statute exempting religious periodicals (and no others) from
a state sales tax.43 This case has been greeted by some as if it were a
repudiation of the concept of legislative accommodations and inconsistent with Amos. 4 4 However, the plurality opinion-written by
the Court's leading exponent of free exercise exemptions, Justice
Brennan-expressly reaffirmed the free exercise exemption cases
and was careful to note that "we in no way suggest that all benefits
conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on
account of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment
Clause unless they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."' 4 5 In
Texas Monthly, the Court could discern "[n]o concrete need to accommodate religious activity," 4 6 and in the absence of a legitimate
accommodative purpose, the exemption was nothing but a benefit
to religion. The concurring and dissenting opinions would have al47
lowed even greater latitude for accommodation of religion.
40. Id. at 335.
41. Id. at 338.
42. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
43. Id- at 21-25.

44. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373, 388.
45. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
46. Id. at 18. I do not necessarily agree with the Court that sales taxes are not a
serious inhibition on the distribution of religious magazines. As the Court noted, a legislative accommodation is justified if it is "designed to alleviate government intrusions
that might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause", id. at 18 n.8, even if the Free Exercise Clause does not require
an accommodation. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the Court struck down facially neutral taxes on doorto-door selling, as applied to Jehovah's Witness colporteurs. The purported distinction
of Murdock and Follett in Texas Monthly (the former cases involved "flat taxes") was so thin
that Justices Blackmun and O'Connor were moved to comment that the plurality had
"subordinat[ed] the Free Exercise value" to the Establishment value, "at the expense of
longstanding precedents." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 906 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). A situation so close to a recognized free exercise exemption right ought to have been sufficient to justify a legislative exemption. A
more persuasive basis for the decision in Texas Monthly was suggested byJustice White in
a one-paragraph concurrence, where he argued that the Press Clause of the First
Amendment prohibits differential taxation of periodicals on the basis of their content.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring). Where free exercise activity
takes the form of pure speech or publication, the content-neutrality principles of the
Speech and Press Clauses arguably control over the content-based protections of the
Religion Clauses.
47. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor stated in a concurring opinion that the statute
"might survive Establishment Clause scrutiny" if it "exempted from taxation the sale of
atheistic literature distributed by an atheistic organization." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at

19921

697

Employment Division v. Smith, though primarily a free exercise case,
also has implications for the Establishment Clause treatment of legislative accommodations. The Court referred approvingly to state
laws that exempted the religious use of peyote from the criminal
law, and observed that "to say that a nondiscriminatory religiouspractice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
say that it is constitutionally required." 48 This view, coupled with
Amos and Texas Monthly, virtually assures that properly drafted legislative accommodations will be upheld against Establishment Clause
challenges.
B.

The Establishment Clause Test in Accommodation Cases

In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan articulated a three-step framework for analyzing cases involving benefits to religion. 49 Because
Brennan tended to adopt a strict understanding of the Establishment Clause, it is safe to predict that the Court's position toward
accommodation will not be more restrictive than this test. It consists of three questions: (1) Are the benefits provided to a broad
array of recipients, secular as well as religious?; (2) Do the benefits
alleviate an obstacle to the exercise of an independent religious
choice (or, conversely, do they create an incentive or inducement
for making that choice)?; and (3) Is there an undue burden on
nonbeneficiaries? I will also discuss a fourth possible element in accommodation analysis, not mentioned in Texas Monthly: (4) Is the
accommodation provided to all similarly situated religions without
favoritism or discrimination?
1.

The Array of Beneficiaries

The first step in the Supreme Court's accommodation analysis is
to ask whether the benefits flow to nonreligious as well as religious
groups, in a manner defined by secular criteria. 50 When a "subsidy
is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as
religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end,
the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive
the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by
the Establishment Clause."5 1 This is an important doctrinal development in its own right, with implications for issues such as educational choice. It appears likely that the Establishment Clause will no
longer be used so often as a rationale for discriminating against religion in the mixed public-private sector.
To satisfy the first stage of this analysis, it is not necessary that
every conceivable nonreligious analog to religion be included, but
29 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This statement apparently means that a viewpoint-neu-

tral exemption for periodicals addressing religious issues would be constitutional, even
if periodicals addressing secular subjects are taxed.
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
49. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11-15.
50. See id. at 10-17.
51. Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
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simply that the array be broad enough to show that religion is not
being singled out. In Justice Harlan's words, quoted by Justice
Brennan: "In any particular case the critical question is whether the
circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be
fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall
within the natural perimeter." 52 As Justice Brennan noted, the necessary breadth of the array of beneficiaries will vary according to the
nature of the program. 53 In Texas Monthly, for example, the sales tax
exemption did not have to extend to all magazines; it could have
been confined to publications devoted to "discussion about questions of ultimate value and the contours of a good or meaningful
life." 54 One suspects that, in practice, this category would not be
much larger than the one struck down in Texas Monthly. 5 5 In an educational choice program, if state financial assistance is extended to
private schools, it may not be confined to religious schools; the relevant category is probably all accredited schools, or at least all nonprofit accredited schools satisfying economic criteria for eligibility.
If a government program is "wholly neutral in offering ...

assist-

ance to a class defined without reference to religion," 5 6 it should
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny without further analysis.
Only if the benefits flow exclusively (or nearly so) to religious individuals or institutions is it necessary to proceed to the next step in
7
the analysis.

5

52. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), cited in
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16.
53. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16.
54. Id. at 16.
55. See supra text accompanying note 42.
56. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,490-91 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring).
57. Professor Mark Tushnet has interpreted Texas Monthly as forbidding the legislature to "single[] out religious activities by name ....

If religious activities are to be

exempted from general regulations, 'the benefits derived by religious organizations
[must] flow[] to a large number of nonreligious groups as well.'" Tushnet, supra note
44, at 389 (quoting Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11). He thus treats the first step in the
analysis as a necessary, rather than a sufficient, element. This interpretation, however, is
a misreading of Texas Monthly. The quoted language from the opinion appeared not in a
discussion of religious accommodations, but in a separate section of the opinion addressing "government policies with secular objectives [that] incidentally benefit religion." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 10. The Court's examples were tuition tax credits,
property tax exemptions, and access to public facilities by religious clubs. Id. at 10-11.
Properly read, Texas Monthly stands for the proposition that government benefits to religion can be sustained under the Establishment Clause if the benefits either "flow[] to a
large number of nonreligious groups as well [as religious entities]," id. at 11, or are
"designed to alleviate governmental intrusions [on religious practices]," id. at 18 n.8.
Contrary to Professor Tushnet, the Court explicitly denied that it was suggesting "that
all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account
of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
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2.

Accommodation Versus Inducement

The second step in the Court's accommodation analysis is to ask
whether the challenged government action is "designed to alleviate
government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a
particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise
Clause."5 8 Although the Court has not had an opportunity to flesh
out the operational meaning of this principle, it seems plausible to
interpret this step as inquiring into the effects of the challenged action on the intended beneficiary. If the effect is to remove a significant obstacle to the exercise of a religious belief adopted
independently of the government action, the accommodation is legitimate. By contrast, if the effect is to induce the person to adopt
(or feign) the religious belief in order to receive the benefits of the
accommodation, the government action goes beyond the range of
permissible accommodation and becomes an unlawful establishment of religion. In then-Justice Rehnquist's words, "governmental
assistance which does not have the effect of 'inducing' religious belief, but instead merely 'accommodates' or implements an independent religious choice does not impermissibly involve the
government in religious choices and therefore does not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 59 This analysis requires a careful distinction between government "benefits" or "inducements" to religion, on the one hand, and the lifting of
government "restraints" or "inhibitions" on religion, on the
other.60 This approach is consistent with Madison's apparent position on accommodations. While he supported constitutional exemptions for religious individuals from laws that would compel
them to violate their "religious[] scrup[les]," 6 1 he opposed measures that would convey upon persons of certain religious faiths "extraordinary privileges, by which proselytes may be enticed from all
62
others."
58. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8; see also id. at 15 (stating that the test is whether
the challenged action can "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed
deterrent to the free exercise of religion").
59. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 727 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan has offered a similar formulation. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. This corresponds to the economic distinction between subsidies and penalties.
See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religions
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1989).
61. Madison proposed that the following provision be appended to what is now the
Second Amendment: "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 25, at
451 (June 8, 1789). Madison's proposed language for the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, similarly, espoused a broad view of the need for accommodations of religion
"unless under color of religion the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the
State are manifestly endangered." See McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1463 (quoting SANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 492 (1902)).
62. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63, 66 (1947). In the same passage, Madison also
objected to granting "peculiar exemptions" to members of certain specified denominations, when there are other sects with a similar claim. Id. This relates to the issue of
denominational equality, discussed infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text, but it is
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Undoubtedly, some government actions with respect to religion
encourage or induce the religious practice being accommodated. If
the government exempts "ministers of the gospel" from paying
taxes (while continuing to accord them all government benefits paid
for out of tax revenues), the exemption creates an incentive to become a minister. Public school prayer is another conspicuous example: Especially in the younger years, organized school prayer
inculcates even as it accommodates, making it impossible to distinguish "independent religious choice" from conformity to authority. 63 Other government actions with respect to religion are pure
accommodations. For example, if the government exempts Sikh
construction workers from the safety requirement of wearing a hard
hat (which conflicts with their religion), this exemption will not
make it more desirable for individuals to adopt the Sikh religion. It
will simply remove a government obstacle to adherence to their
faith. Allowing Jewish prisoners a special diet will not encourage
kosher eating (as long as the alternative meals are no better than the
standard fare); allowing Amish buggy drivers not to display a bright
orange triangle will not induce conversions to the Amish religion;
allowing Native American Church members to ingest peyote at religious ceremonials will not create an incentive to practice peyotism
(because peyote is not a desirable recreational drug); allowing Jewish military officers to wear yarmulkes will not induce non-Jews to
become Jews or to cover their heads in homage to the God of Israel.
Difficult intermediate cases also exist. Some accommodations facilitate a religious practice independently arrived at, but concurrently create some additional incentive to adopt the practice. An
example is the exemption for Jewish merchants from the Sunday
Closing law, denied under the Free Exercise Clause in Braunfeld v.
Brown 6 4 but upheld against Establishment Clause challenge in Arlan's Department Store, Inc. v. Kentucky. 65 On the one hand, the observance of the Sabbath on Saturday is a long-held tenet of Judaism,
and the principal effect of the exemption is to relieve the economic
sometimes mistakenly read as a categorical condemnation of religious "exemptions" altogether, even when extended evenhandedly to all faiths that face a particular conflict
with the law. In light of Madison's advocacy of religious draft exemptions, that is an

implausible construction of the passage.
63. I thus disagree with Justice Stewart, who argued that spoken school prayer and
Bible reading could be defended on accommodationist grounds. See School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308-320 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 444-450 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Because only one religious tradition

(a watered-down nondenominational theism) was reflected in these exercises, the tendency was to flatten and homogenize the student's religious lives rather than to give

greater latitude to religious pluralism. Moreover, in practical terms, the exercises had a
coercive impact on those who wished not to participate.
64. 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
65. 371 U.S. 218, 219-20 (1962).
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pressure to violate the Sabbath generated by the enforced closure
on Sunday. On the other hand, because the large majority of stores
are owned by non-Jews, the combined effect of the Sunday Closing
law and the exemption is to give the stores owned by Saturday Sabbath observers a competitive edge they would not have if there were
no Sunday Closing law. Similarly, an exemption from military service accommodates a sincere belief, but also creates a significant incentive to adopt the tenet of pacifism. Cases of mixed effect, such as
these, call for difficult exercise of judgment to determine which effect is likely to be primary. In many such cases the result has been
to deny a free exercise exemption but to uphold a legislative accommodation if one is made. 6 6 That approach may well be the best resolution of this thorny problem.
3.

Burdens on Nonbeneficiaries

The third step in the analytical framework set forth in Texas
Monthly is to ask whether the challenged accommodation would "impose substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries." 67 The logic here is
that a truly neutral government (one that valued all of the legitimate
interests of its citizens, without bias or favoritism) would take into
consideration the impact of its actions on religious practice, but
would not necessarily allow those considerations to outweigh substantial competing interests. This logic does not mean that the costs
to others must be reduced to zero, but that they should not be "un68
due" in light of the need for accommodation.
At one time, I believed that only the religious freedom interests of
other parties should be treated as a constitutional limit on legislative
accommodations. 6 9 My reasoning was that it is anomalous to give
purely economic interests constitutional protection when the legislative purpose is to accommodate religion, when those interests receive no constitutional protection against other forms of legislation.
Protection for purely economic countervailing interests appears to
resurrect economic substantive due process. If a state imposes costs
on the employer for the purpose of accommodating a worker's pregnancy, jury duty, or military service, with virtually no serious constitutional scrutiny, why should it be unconstitutional to impose
similar costs for the purpose of accommodating a worker's religion?
Thus, I contended that accommodations should be invalid on account of the burdens on nonbeneficiaries only if those burdens were
infringements on First Amendment (not economic) rights. School
prayer is an unconstitutional accommodation because it invades the
66. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. The most famous example is exemption from military conscription, which is not a free exercise right but has been statutorily
granted by Congress and upheld by the Court. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
67. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); see id. at 14-15.
68. For an argument that accommodation should not be permitted when the "secular costs of accommodation are high," see Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible
Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE LJ. 127 (1990).
69. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 37-39.
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religious freedom of those who do not wish to participate; the sabbath protection law is not unconstitutional
because the only interest
70
invaded is the employer's pocketbook.
I now think that my prior position was too narrow. An accommodation that imposes costs on others disproportionate to the alleviation of a burden on religious practice could be a form of favoritism
for religion, symmetrical to the hostility to religion evinced by the
legislature's refusal to give religious concerns as much weight as
secular concerns, as was the case in Sherbert v. Verner. 7 1 Presumably,
this threat is more serious when religious practices of politically influential groups are accommodated at the expense of others, than
when minority groups are accommodated.
It remains to be seen how much of a burden on nonbeneficiaries
is too much. The language in Texas Monthly ("substantial burdens")
is not well chosen, because it appears to refer to the absolute magnitude of the burden rather than to the possible disproportionality
between the burden imposed and the burden alleviated. Surely a
larger burden is justified to alleviate a major obstacle to religious
exercise than to alleviate a minor obstacle. In Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc.,7 2 the Court held that a Connecticut statute violated the
Establishment Clause because it required employers to adjust work
schedules so that workers who observe a sabbath could have that
day off, a requirement the Court found "absolute and unqualified."'7 3 The Court noted that there were no exceptions in the statute for "special circumstances" where the accommodation of
Sabbath observers "would cause the employer substantial economic
burdens or . . . require the imposition of significant burdens on
other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers." 7 4 This holding suggests an upper bound on the accommodation principle, where the burden on the nonbeneficiaries is
disproportionate to the effect on the believer.
70. See id.
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See the analysis of Sherbert in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
708 (1986) (Burger, CJ., joined by Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.) (Where the government extends accommodation to other private interests, the "refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent" against
religion.).
72. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). Readers should be aware that I participated in this litigation as author of an amicus curiae brief for the United States in defense of the constitutionality of the statute.
73. Id. at 710.
74. Id. at 709-10. The error in the Court's analysis was to treat the absolute character of the statute as the basis for striking it down on its face. There was no evidence that
accommodation of the petitioner in the particular circumstances would be especially
burdensome. If Establishment Clause challenges are subject to the same principles of
facial and as-applied challenges as are cases in other areas, the Connecticut statute
should have been upheld if it was susceptible to constitutional application. See Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). That there might be applications of the law that would
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On the other hand, in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,75 the Court
construed the religious accommodation provision of Title VII as requiring no more than "de minimis" accommodation-probably out
of concern that a more burdensome accommodation requirement
would violate the Establishment Clause. 76 This cannot be the constitutional test; most accommodations that have been recognized as
77
legitimate impose more than a de minimis burden on others.
Moreover, when legislatures adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life among the citizens, they regularly impose more than a de
minimis burden for the purpose of protecting important interests of
the beneficiary class. The legislature should have as much latitude
to protect the exercise of religion that it has to protect other important values in life. Indeed, to prevent accommodation of religion
when accommodation of other values is permitted would evince an
indifference or hostility toward religion out of keeping with the fundamental premises of the First Amendment. Congress struck the
balance in Title VII by requiring "reasonabl[e] accommodat[ion],"
short of "undue hardship" to the employer 7 8-the same statutory
standard that it applies to accommodation of persons with disabilities. 79 This standard seems superior-recognizing that accommodations may impose more than a de minimis burden, but that an
"unyielding weighing in favor" of religious interests80 crosses the
line between reasonable accommodation and favoritism.
Another aspect of the analysis should be whether alternative accommodations could be found that would reduce the secular costs
to nonbeneficiaries. The burden on others can be said to be "undue" if it could be eliminated or reduced without significantly undermining the accommodative purpose. An example is the
administration of some released time programs in public schools,
which allow students to leave the premises for a class period to
study religion under the auspices of their own chosen religious instructor. In my view, the purpose of these programs is legitimate:
They provide an opportunity for students who cannot afford to attend private schools to include a religious component in their education, and thereby redress (in part) the inhibition on religious
impose excessive costs on employers or fellow workers should not have been a basis for
striking the statute down on its face.

75. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
76. Id at 84. The Court did not explicitly refer to the Establishment Clause as a
basis for its interpretation, but the petitioner had argued in the case that "to construe
the statute to require further efforts at accommodation would create an establishment of
religion contrary to the First Amendment," id. at 70, and as an interpretation of the
statute alone, the decision is almost certainly wrong, see id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(the Court's interpretation "effectively nulliflies]" the statute). See also id. at 89-90 (suggesting that the Court adopted this construction in order to avoid consideration of the
constitutional question).
77. Draft exemptions for religious conscientious objectors, for example, increase
the probability that other eligible young men will be forced to fight, and perhaps die.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5) (West 1991).
80. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
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education caused by the combination of compulsory school attendance laws and the secular character of the public school curriculum.
But what will happen to the remaining students, who choose not to
participate in the released time program? If the school fails to provide useful and attractive alternative uses for the time, then they will
be forced to waste a valuable part of the school daym-a circumstance
that may also serve as an incentive to participate in the program,
even if they would not otherwise choose to do so. Since it is possible for the school to alleviate this burden without injury to the released time program, I would treat the burden as "undue." The
remedy, of course, is not to cancel the released time program, but to
81
provide alternatives for the remaining students.
It would be helpful in all these cases for courts to compare the
extent of accommodation of religion and the burdens entailed by
accommodation, to the extent and burden of accommodation of
other important private interests in an analogous context. Freedom
of religion, for example, could be compared to reproductive autonomy, which is another important personal right that comes into conflict with the economic interests of employers and fellow workers.
In CaliforniaFederalSavings & Loan Ass' v. Guerra,82 the Court upheld
a state statute requiring employers to provide female employees an
unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. 83 This accommodation was no less "absolute" and far more costly than that
in Thornton. The existence of this accommodation to a nonreligious
personal interest suggests that state governments are not discriminating in favor of religion, but are simply attempting to protect the
personal rights of workers that are most likely to come into conflict
with the demands of the workplace.
Any comparison of benefits and burdens will admittedly suffer the
problem of comparing apples and oranges. One should therefore
not expect a high degree of rigor at this stage of the analysis. The
courts should be satisfied if they have examined the legislative accommodation and determined that the burden on nonbeneficiaries
is not obviously disproportionate. Deference to legislative judgment is appropriate here; secular economic interests are not underrepresented in the political process.
81. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17, at 163 n.73 (asserting that the constitutionality of a released time program should depend on "whether alternative uses of the
time are suffiently attractive that there is no coercion to attend the religious classes"); see
also McConnell, supra note 14, at 36. Zorach is a difficult case because the opinion does
not provide sufficient information about the activities in which the nonparticipating students were engaged. In my opinion, a released time program of the sort Professor Lupu
experienced as a child, in which the nonparticipating students were inflicted with "an
entirely wasted hour of school," Lupu, supra note 6, at 744, would be unconstitutional.
82. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
83. Id. at 292.
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4.

Equality Among Religions

Although neither Amos nor Texas Monthly alludes to the issue, the
logic of the Religion Clauses requires that accommodations be extended to all comparable religious practices unless the government
has sufficient justification for differential treatment. One of the
most firmly ingrained principles of the Religion Clauses is that all
religious faiths must enjoy an equality of rights. 84 Accommodations
should not be allowed to favor one religion over another.8 5 For this
reason, accommodations should be framed so far as possible in neutral terms, without reference to particular faiths or denominations.
It does not follow, however, that accommodations are suspect
merely because they accommodate only a particular religious practice. Most accommodations are of this sort; when the legislature becomes aware that a particular law or government action infringes on
the religious exercise of a particular religious minority, it typically
carves out a particular exception. When Congress enacted Prohibition, it incorporated an exception for sacramental wine; when Congress enacted military conscription, it included an exception for
religious conscientious objectors; when Congress extended Social
Security to self-employed persons, it included an exemption. That
these laws work to the benefit of only those religious groups whose
practices are inconsistent with the law in question cannot be an
objection.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's explanation for the invalidation of the
sabbath protection law in Thornton should not be accepted. She
complained that the statute "single[d] out Sabbath observers for
special ...

protection without according similar accommodation to

ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees." 8 6 She presumably was referring to religious dress requirements or prayer requirements that may conflict with the rules of the
workplace, and that were not accommodated by the sabbath protection law. One commentator has called this a "discriminatory favoring of Sabbatarian over other religious traditions. '8 7 But Justice
84. As Madison stated in Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments:
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no
more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural
rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the
free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience."
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against ReligiousAssessments, reprinted in Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 66 (1947) (quoting the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
arts. 1, 16 (emphasis added by Madison)).
85. The Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680
(1989), appears to violate this principle by denying tax benefits to the Church of
Scientology that are extended to other religious groups. See id. at 700-03. Nothing in
the opinion suggests, however, that the Court intended to alter established constitutional doctrine on this point. The case appears to be one in which the unattractive qualities of the religious group involved may have influenced the Court to fail to apply the
law as it should have been applied, as the dissenting opinion ofJustice O'Connor persuasively argues. Id. at 704-13 (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor J.,
concurring).
87. Lupu, supra note 6, at 769.
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O'Connor and the commentator failed to take into account the context of the statute. The statute was not addressed to work conditions in general; it was part of the state law imposing a six-day work
limitation and liberalizing the state's former Sunday Closing law.
The only religious practice affected by the law under consideration
was the observance of the sabbath. The state does not discriminate
when it includes a Sabbath protection requirement in a law pertaining to work days, any more than it discriminates when it includes a
labor union exemption (for members of sects that cannot join) in a
labor statute, a spiritual healing exemption in a statute governing
medicine, or a sacramental use exemption for peyote in the drug
laws. It is only natural for legislatures to address free exercise
problems as they arise.
The problem of denominational discrimination arises only when
an accommodation is extended exclusively to members of certain
faiths, when members of other faiths face the same burden of religious exercise. For example, if the Prohibition law had exempted
wine used for a eucharistic mass but not wine used for a Jewish Seder, that would have been discriminatory. If Congress exempted
Quakers and Mennonites from the draft, but not members of other
churches who entertain similar convictions about participation in
war, that would be discriminatory. Discrimination of this sort would
require powerful justification.
The requirement of denominational neutrality must, however, be
applied realistically. Not all religious practices have the same impact on government policy, and too exacting a requirement of equal
treatment would likely discourage sensible and beneficial accommodations. In Cruz v. Beto, 88 for example, a lone Buddhist prisoner demanded equal treatment in terms of chapel access, chaplains,
worship services, and religious books and facilities, to that provided
prisoners of more numerous denominations. Obviously that is not
practical, and such a requirement would have the effect of causing
prison officials to curtail religious accommodations for the rest of
the inmates. The Supreme Court held that "a special chapel or
place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of
size, nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without
regard to the extent of the demand." 8 9 The proper disposition of
other cases is less clear. In Gillette v. United States,90 the Court upheld
the federal law exempting religious conscientious objectors from all
wars, but not objectors to particular wars, on the grounds that adjudication of the latter claims presented a far more serious "danger of
88. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
89. Id. at 322 n.2.

90. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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erratic decisionmaking." 9 1 A recent appellate court decision involved the federal regulations that exempt peyote use by the Native
American Church. These permissive exemptions do not apply to
the "Peyote Way Church of God," an unrelated, largely urban, nonNative American church that subscribes to many tenets similar to
those of the Native American Church.9 2 In upholding the exclusion
of the group from the exemption, the court reasoned that the differential treatment is attributable to the federal government's "constitutional role as protector of tribal Native Americans" and that an
exemption for non-Indian groups does not have any such justification.9 3 Courts must scrutinize these differences in treatment to ensure that the reasons are not pretextual, but it would be
counterproductive to forbid them altogether. The test seems to be
that accommodations need not be equal if there are "neutral, secular reasons," 9 4 not based on religious favoritism, for distinguishing
among religious beliefs.
If it is found that an accommodation is improperly discriminatory,
the proper remedy is not to invalidate the exemption, but to extend
the exemption to others under the Free Exercise Clause, unless
there is good reason to believe that the legislature would have preferred to accommodate no one rather than to extend the accommodation to all similarly affected groups. This is a routine application
of severability principles, consistent with constitutional doctrine in
the analogous area of equal protection, 9 5 but the point has eluded
some judges. 96 Thus, it should not be possible for a person having
no claim for accommodation to bring a lawsuit under the Establishment Clause to strike down an accommodation law on the ground
that it impermissibly excluded some other group. Only a member
of the excluded group has standing to raise the issue of denominational discrimination.
C. Mandatory and PermissibleAccommodations
Justice Brennan insisted at several points in his Texas Monthly
opinion that his approach would permit accommodations that are
not actually mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. "[W]e in no way
suggest that all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups
or upon individuals on account of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by the
91. Id. at 458.
92. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 1217.
94. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 458.
95. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (extending Social Security benefits to widowed father). Similarly, in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the benefit of the law
was extended to the excluded group rather than denied to the benefitted group.
96. In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, for example, Chief Judge Clark
would have invalidated the peyote exemptions in federal law and the law of some 23
states, needed for the protection of the religious worship of some 250,000 Native American Church members, because the exemption was not also extended to the 150 members of the Peyote Way Church of God. 922 F.2d at 1220-21 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
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Free Exercise Clause."'9 7 This repudiates the position, sometimes
found in the literature, 98 that the political branches have no discretion to institute accommodations that are not constitutionally compelled by the Free Exercise Clause.
Unfortunately, however, the Court has not made clear precisely
what the relation is between permissible and mandatory accommodations. Amos speaks of "alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference" with religious practice, 9 9 and Texas Monthly speaks of
"remov[ing] a demonstrated and possibly grave imposition on religious activity sheltered by the Free Exercise Clause."' 10 0 We know
that the government has some latitude to accommodate religion beyond the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause, but there has
been no discussion of where the line may be drawn.
Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, 10 1 the accommodation question could be seen as a variant on the theme of institutional capacity
and judicial restraint.' 0 2 The Free Exercise Clause, like all provisions of the Constitution, is addressed to the political branches as
well as to the judiciary, and both have a responsibility to enforce it.
Indeed, Congress is textually vested with the power to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which include the protections of the First Amendment. 0 3 The judiciary, moreover, is properly constrained in its enforcement of the Constitution; it must not
override legislative decisions except where the demands of the Constitution are reasonably clear.' 0 4 Courts are particularly constrained
when part of the constitutional analysis includes whether the government's action serves a "substantial governmental purpose."
This judgment implicates questions of legislative policy, and the decisions of the political branches must necessarily carry great weight.
When the legislature itself considers a question of free exercise,
by contrast, it is not so constrained. The legislature can assess supposed government interests without deference to anyone. It is to be
expected, therefore, that legislative accommodations will often extend to conflicts between conscience and law where the judiciary
97. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); see also id at 14-15.
98. Lupu, supra note 6, at 749-54.
99. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
100. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
101. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
102. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 371 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing institutional competence of Congress to promote "free exercise values" even
where the Court would not require it).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
104. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring); see Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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would be bound to enforce law notwithstanding the claim of
conscience.
This analysis has become complicated by the decision in Smith,
which was decided after Amos and Texas Monthly. According to Smith,
neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. 0 5 When the legislature carves out an accommodation, after
Smith, it is not merely expanding on the believer's free exercise
rights; it is creating a protection wholly unlike that reflected in the
First Amendment. After Smith, to say that the government may not
make any accommodations not mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause is to say that it may not make any accommodations.
Smith obviously did not shrink the scope of permissible accommodation, and in light of its grounding in judicial restraint, the opinion
may augur an expansion.106 It is safe to assume that any accommodation that might have been thought mandatory under the pre-Smith
test is still permissible. Moreover, as Justice Brennan made clear in
Texas Monthly, the Establishment Clause permits the legislature to
make accommodations in cases in which the courts would not have
required them even under the prior test. He specifically cited three
cases in which the Court approved, or would have approved, accommodations that it had determined were not constitutionally
0 7

required. 1

There are three principal ways in which the government's authority to accommodate is broader than its obligation to accommodate
under pre-Smith law. First, the government should be entitled to
recognize and accommodate burdens on free exercise that would
not be recognized as such by the courts. Free exercise claims are
frequently rejected at the first stage of the analysis, without any examination of the importance of the governmental interest, on the
ground that there was no cognizable "burden" on religion. In many
such instances, however, a government committed to religious pluralism should be entitled to recognize and accommodate the religious interest, even if it does not fit within the judiciary's definition
of "burden" under the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 108 the Court held that religious plaintiffs have no constitutional right to affect the government's use of its own land, but stated that that "need not and should
not discourage [the government] from accommodating religious
practices like those engaged in by the [plaintiffs]."' 10 9 Similarly, in
105. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
106. The author of Smith, Justice Scalia, took an expansive view of permissible accommodation in Texas Monthly, but supplied no standard for determining the boundary of
permissibility.
107. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), as cases in which accommodations that would have been held mandatory were approved, and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), as a case in which accommodation that was denied by the
Court would be permissible if enacted by Congress).
108. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
109. Id. at 454.
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Tony & Susan Alamo Foundationv. Secretary of Labor, 10 the Court expressed skepticism that the acceptance of wages (in accordance with
minimum wage laws) would conflict with the petitioners' religious
practices," 1 ' but there surely would be no constitutional obstacle if
the government had come to the opposite conclusion and had made
appropriate accommodation.
Indeed, broadening the definition of burden will sometimes obviate the entanglements caused by determinations of what claims are
sincere and religious. In Amos, for example, the Free Exercise
Clause (as understood before Smith) was interpreted to require the
state to allow religious organizations to employ religious criteria for
hiring persons whose duties are closely connected to the religious
mission of the church.' 12 But to confine the exemption to those
workers would require the government to "determin[e] whether an
activity is religious or secular [by means of a] searching case-by-case
analysis," which would "result[] in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious affairs." ' 1 3 It is better to allow the
government to extend the exemption to all the noncommercial activities of the church.
Second, the legislature is entitled to conclude that accommodation is possible without undue damage to "compelling governmental interests" even if a court would be reluctant to reach such a
conclusion. The legislature presumably is the best judge of the necessity of its own policies, whereas courts are ordinarily reluctant to
controvert legislative judgments of policy.'1 4 This reluctance is especially evident in certain categories of cases, such as those involving the military, the prisons, or the use of government land, where
the courts typically defer to governmental assessments of need, and
rarely override government policy in the interest of protecting constitutional rights. 1 5 Accommodations are particularly vital in these
110. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
111. Id. at 304-05; cf id. at 303 n.27 (citing but disregarding testimony of adherents
about their religious beliefs).
112. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (assuming for the sake of argument that the
Free Exercise Clause requires "no more" than exemption of employees engaged in religious activities); idt at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that interference with the religious organization's hiring for religious activities "involves what we
normally regard as infringement on free exercise rights").
113. Id at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
114. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 83 (1981) (holding that the lower court
"was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence [regarding
the justifications for the policy under constitutional challenge], rather than adopting an
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of that evidence"); see also
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2372 (1990) (stating that the Court does
"not lightly second-guess such legislative judgments"); Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (stating that the Court "must
afford great weight to the decisions of Congress").
115. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
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contexts, where religious exercise is all but impossible without government cooperation. But even in other contexts, the legislature
should be permitted to decide that its rules are not of sufficient importance to override legitimate religious objections.
Third-contrary to language in the recent accommodation
cases' 16 -the government should be able to require accommodations in the private sector, at least where it has extended comparable
protections to secular concerns of a similar character. For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to make
"reasonable accommodations" to the religious needs of their employees.1 1 7 Obviously, accommodations of this sort are not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause, because there is no state action;
yet they are widely assumed to be legitimate. In reference to Title
VII, Justice Marshall observed: "If the State does not establish religion over nonreligion by excusing religious practitioners from obligations owed the State, I do not see how the State can be said to
establish religion by requiring employers to
do the same with re18
spect to obligations owed the employer."'
In part, the issue of accommodations in the private sphere hinges
on conceptual changes in legal doctrine arising from the twentiethcentury expansion of the welfare-regulatory state. In an earlier era,
when most personal interests were left to the tender mercies of the
private market, the accommodation of religion in the private sphere
would have been a form of promotion or favoring of religion. Now,
when government intervenes in the private sphere to protect a wide
variety of personal interests, the idea that religious interests (alone)
should be treated with indifference cannot be maintained. When
government protects religious freedom in the private sphere in ways
comparable to its protection of secular interests, it should be held to
be constitutional.
(government land); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prisons);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military). In Shabazz, accommodations
were made, and then terminated, before the litigation; in Goldman and Lyng, accommodations were made after the litigation.
116. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (stating that "when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by

the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot
reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise
of religion... it 'provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations'
and cannot but 'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the community" (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Title VII attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed
by private employers, and hence it is not the sort of accommodation statute specifically
contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause.").
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
118. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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III. Arguments Against Religious Accommodations, with Responses
Since 1985, several legal scholars have published extended criticisms of the doctrine of accommodation. These critics divide into
three camps. 119 Some contend that legislative accommodation is
permissible under the Establishment Clause but that accommodation is never required by the Free Exercise Clause. 20 Some contend that accommodations are sometimes mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause but that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to
accommodate religion when not required to do So.121 These two
positions both style themselves as anti-accommodationist, but they
are diametrically opposed to one another. Finally, some contend
that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel, and the Establishment Clause does not permit, accommodation of religion. 122
The most common anti-accommodationist position is that legislative accommodations are constitutionally permissible under the
Establishment Clause (in proper circumstances) but not constitutionally compelled by the Free Exercise Clause. 123 This view coincides with the current majority position on the Supreme Court. On
closer inspection, however, the arguments offered in opposition to
constitutionally compelled exemptions usually turn out to be arguments against legislative exemptions as well. I will therefore address first the argument that accommodations are unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause, and then turn to the various arguments made against mandatory accommodations.
A.

The Argument That Accommodations Are Unconstitutional

I consider the argument that accommodations of religion are by
their very nature unconstitutional in purpose and effect extremely
weak. By this I do not mean that all government benefits to religion
called "accommodations" are constitutional, but that accommodations that comply with the standards set forth in the previous section
119. Here I address doctrinal arguments. I have not had an opportunity to see or
respond to the historical arguments raised by Professor Philip Hamburger in his forthcoming article. Philip Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 1992). I understand
Hamburger's argument to relate to the questions of mandatory accommodation, which I
agree presents a close question, rather than permissible accommodation, where I consider the historical evidence strongly in favor.
120. See William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308 (1991); West, supra note 30.
121. See Lupu, supra note 6; Lupu, supra note 5.
122. See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsideringthe Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75 (1990);
Tushnet, supra note 44; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principleof Accommodation of Religion
(Dubitante), 76 GEO. LJ. 1691 (1988).
123. See Marshall, supra note 120; West, supra note 30.
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are constitutional.124

To begin with, there is no ambiguity with regard to the historical
record: Accommodations of religion in the years up to the framing
of the First Amendment were frequent and well known, and no one
took the position that they constituted an establishment of religion.
For the most part, the largely Protestant population of the states as
of 1789 entertained few religious tenets in conflict with the civil
law; 12 5 but where there were conflicts, accommodations were a frequent solution.126 Although the existence of these exemptions does
27 it
not necessarily establish that accommodations were mandatory,
at least demonstrates that they were permitted. The Continental
Congress, for example, exempted members of the peace churches
from military conscription, 28 and Madison, at the urging of the ratifying conventions of North Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island,
29
proposed that this policy be enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
Madison's proposal was narrowly defeated, but the principal opponents took the position that such exemptions should be left to the
discretion of the legislature. Typical was the argument of Egbert
Benson that "the Legislature will always possess humanity enough
to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of;
but they ought to be left to their discretion."'' 30 The anti-accommodation position thus flies in the face of what we know about the purposes and understanding of the Religion Clauses.
It is significant, as well, that early nineteenth-century judicial decisions rejecting claims for mandatory accommodation under state constitutional free exercise provisions invariably assumed that
accommodations were within the legislative discretion.' 3 ' Decisions
granting such claims (as well as decisions containing dicta regarding
the conditions under which such claims would be granted)' 3 2 are
124. See supra notes 32-118 and accompanying text.
125. The Baptists, who were the most assertive advocates of religious freedom at the
time of the framing and ratification of the First Amendment, had no religious objections
to taxes, oaths, or bearing arms-the principal occasions of conflict between civil law
and religious conscience that arose during this period. JOHN LELAND, The Virginia Chronicle, in THE WRrINGS OFJOHN LELAND 120 (L.F. Greene ed., photo reprint 1969) (1845).
This helps to explain why exemptions do not figure prominently in the Baptist arguments for free exercise. See West, supra note 30, at 631-32.
126. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1466-73.
127. That legislatures chose to make accommodations does not prove that they
thought they had to. When constitutional principles are enforced through legislatures
rather than judicial review, it is usually impossible to distinguish between legislative policy and legislative constitutionalism. Here, the argument is enhanced by the fact that the
appeals for exemption were often framed in terms of natural or constitutional rights.
128. See Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 187, 189 (1905).
129. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 451 (June 8, 1789).
130. l id.at 780 (Aug. 17, 1789).
131. See, e.g., Simon's Ex'rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 417 (Pa. 1831) (describing a
free exercise claim for the priest-penitent privilege as involving "considerations of policy [that] address themselves with propriety to the legislature").
132. E.g., Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 326 (1848) (rejecting free exercise
exemption from Sunday Closing law but implying that there might be such a claim if the
claimant's religion required work on Sunday); accord Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. &
Rawle 48, 50 (Pa. 1817).
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similarly inconsistent with the theory that accommodations are establishments. Indeed, the notion that exemptions violate the
nonestablishment principle seems to have been absent from early
nineteenth-century legal argument.
Much of the historical argument against accommodations is based
on a straw man: that proponents of accommodation believe that in
every conflict between religious conscience and the law, conscience
must prevail, no matter what the consequence. Professor Ellis West,
for example, writes that on historical grounds "it is simply not credible to say that the free exercise clause of the first amendment was
intended to give persons or churches the right to disobey laws with
impunity provided they had religious reasons for wishing to do
so."113 3 Indeed, such an extreme assertion would not be credible.
The actual question is of more limited scope: whether there are occasions in which the Free Exercise Clause requires that religious exercise be given precedence over civil law. To say that there are valid
free exercise claims for exemption does not mean that all claims for
free exercise exemption are valid.
Putting aside the historical question, it is exceedingly impractical
to treat accommodations of religion as categorically unconstitutional. It stands to reason that when a particular law or government
policy threatens to inflict serious injury to the legitimate interests of
a particular segment of the population, whatever the reason, the
government should consider making a special provision. That the
injury happens to involve religious conscience-a matter of particular importance and concern in a liberal republic-makes the desirability of accommodations even more evident. If accommodations
were deemed illegitimate in principle, the legislature frequently
would be forced to choose between violating the religious conscience of a segment of the population or dispensing with legislation
it considers beneficial to society as a whole. For example, must
Congress choose between attacking the male Catholic priesthood
and failing to forbid sex discrimination in employment? This seems
both pointless and illiberal because it is possible both to protect religious conscience and to achieve the public purpose. To exempt
churches from this aspect of the law seems manifestly more reasonable than either of the alternatives: no exemption or no law.
Opponents of accommodation simply do not face up to the practical consequences of their position-except by trotting out the occasional tired bogeymen of accommodation claims that would have
terrible consequences. 13 4 No one denies that some accommodations would be terrible. But is this an argument against making any
133. West, supra note 30, at 632.
134. E.g., Lupu, supra note 5, at 583-86 (discussing religious exemptions from the
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accommodations at all? For the most part, arguments against accommodation proceed on a high level of abstraction, without descending to address the impact of this position on real people in real
cases.' 3 5 For my part, it would require an extremely powerful argument to persuade me that it is unconstitutional to excuse a Muslim
school child from class for a few moments at the appropriate hours
of the day for prayer, to allow Jewish military personnel to wear a
yarmulke, to permit a church to choose its minister without supervision by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
or to excuse Jehovah's Witnesses from jury duty. How can such
cruel consequences be read into a provision designed to protect the
full and equal rights of religious conscience?
The argument that accommodations are unconstitutional turns
out to be predicated, almost exclusively, on the claim that accommodations are a form of "subsidy"' 3 6 or "favoritism"' i3 7 toward religion-that accommodation "courts the possibility of aggressive
state encouragement of religious activity."' 3 8 This can mean only
one of two things. Either accommodations "favor religion" in the
sense that they reward and encourage religious behavior, or they
"favor religion" in the sense that they protect religion from interference even though nonreligious individuals and institutions would
not receive the same degree of protection.
If the first meaning is adopted, the charge that accommodations
"favor" religion is simply inaccurate. Under the Supreme Court's
analysis of accommodation, set forth in the previous section, government action that rewards or encourages religion is unconstitutional. Accommodation is legitimate only to the point that it
facilitates or removes obstacles to independent religious decisions;
any supposed "accommodation" that induces or "aggressively encourages" a religious practice should be invalidated. There are
many examples of accommodations that permit the religious observer to engage in a practice but create no incentive to do so: to
wear a turban or a yarmulke, to say prayers at designated times, to
limit one's diet, to attend religious services on particular occasions,
requirement to obtain medical treatment for minor children). The literature offers surprisingly few actual examples of objectionable legislative accommodations, perhaps because the political check is generally sufficient to prevent abuse. Professor Lupu's chief
example in this Symposium, the released time program, loses its sting when one considers that the object of his concern, Patti H., chose to participate in the program notwithstanding the "spotlight" it threw on her Catholicism. Lupu, supra note 6, at 744. As
Lupu tells the story, id. Patti's alternatives were worse. Unable to afford a Catholic
education, denied by the public school monopoly on public funds the freedom to choose
an education appropriate to her religious needs, Patti and her family preferred conspicuous accommodation to inconspicuous assimilation.
135. Professor Tushnet, who has moved from a "dubitante" position on accommodations to the view that they are unconstitutional, has acknowledged that the accommodation principle is "normatively attractive" but difficult to "work out as a coherent
principle of constitutional adjudication." Tushnet, supra note 122, at 1691.
136. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 377.
137. Gey, supra note 122, at 77; see also id. at 148 ("A literal reading of the establishment clause would prohibit the state from advancing religion in any way, and would
therefore preclude the accommodation of religion.").
138. Lupu, supra note 6, at 748.
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to avoid personal photographs, to prevent an autopsy on the body
of a loved one, to refuse to display an orange warning triangle on
the back of one's buggy, to decline the benefits of ninth and tenth
grade, to ingest a bitter and unpleasant drug, to decline medical
care, or to refuse to participate in Social Security-just to mention a
few examples from recent free exercise controversies. It is absurd
to say that the government "promotes" these practices when it decides not to penalize them. As Justice Brennan once commented,
exemptions from laws that burden the exercise of religion "reflect[]
nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the
139
face of religious differences."
It is particularly peculiar to say that accommodations "promote"
religion in view of the fact that accommodations in the government
sector arise, by definition, only when religious practices and government policy are in conflict. Far from "enacting into law the religious
preferences of the political majority,"' 140 or bringing about an "alliance between church and state,"' 14 1 accommodations reflect a decision to tolerate dissent from the policies adopted by the political
majority. Accommodations are forbearance, not alliance. They do
not reflect agreement with the minority, but respect for the conflict between temporal and spiritual authority in which the minority finds
itself.
The second possible interpretation of the charge that accommodations "favor religion" is that they protect religious freedom more
than the freedom to conduct oneself in accordance with nonreligious norms. This kind of "favoritism toward religion," however, is
inherent in the very text of the First Amendment. The government
must refrain from actions that officially prefer one religion over another, or religion over nonreligion-even though it is free to embrace certain secular ideologies and organizations and to oppose
others. The government must also refrain from actions that punish
or penalize the practice of religion-though it is free to punish or
penalize other forms of human conduct. How could the First
Amendment forbid the establishment or protect the exercise of
"religion," if religion cannot receive protection not accorded secular individuals or institutions?
Anti-accommodationists are not without response to this "simple
fact," which one scholar has called "the textualist trap."' 14 2 One response is to attribute their conundrum to the First Amendment itself. If the Establishment Clause prohibits the advancement of
139. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
140. Gey, supra note 122, at 76.
141. Id. at 186.
142. Id. at 148. Anti-accommodationists understandably have a tendency to disparage arguments based on constitutional language. See West, supra note 30, at 622 (calling

1992]

religion, and if extending special constitutional protection to free
exercise advances religion, then the Religion Clauses are contradictory; and we should be free to substitute non-textualist interpretations of the self-contradictory text. 14 3 But it is surely more sensible
to ask, instead, whether there is a reading of the two clauses that is
not contradictory-especially since historians tell us that the free exercise and nonestablishment arguments were invoked interchangeably and "represented a double declaration of what Americans
wanted to assert about Church and State" rather than being two
separate, let alone inconsistent principles.1 4 4 In the context of their
purposes and intellectual history, the Religion Clauses are complementary provisions guarding against two equal and opposite threats
to the autonomy of religious life. The Establishment Clause guarantees that the federal (and after incorporation, state and local) government will not give official status or preference to any religion or
religions, and the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that it will not
interfere (without sufficient justification) with the beliefs and practices of any religion. In other words, decisions about whether and
what religious practices to engage in will be left to individual citizens and their churches.
It is the anti-accommodationists who fail to appreciate the significance of the Establishment Clause for the accommodation question.
Anti-accommodationists object to "singling out" religion for special
protection under the Free Exercise Clause, but they typically1 45 have
no qualms about "singling" out religion for special prohibitions
under the Establishment Clause. Government may advance secular
causes such as feminism or capitalism, subsidize controversial private organizations such as Planned Parenthood or the Republican
the accommodationist argument "a classic example of how a literal or common sense
reading of a constitutional or legal text can be completely misleading"); Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 683
(1990).
143. This seems to be the thrust of Stephen Gey's argument:
There are several flaws in these claims that the particular phrasing of the
first amendment mandates that religious expression be given greater protection than nonreligious expression ....
[T]he establishment clause also singles out religion in a manner that directly contradicts the accommodation
principle. A literal reading of the establishment clause would prohibit the
state from advancing religion in any way, and would therefore preclude the
accommodation of religion. The accommodationist and separationist interpretations are each defensible readings of the first amendment, but neither
reading follows inevitably from the simple fact that religion is mentioned in
the constitutional text.
Gey, supra note 122, at 148. I cannot resist commenting in passing that a "literal reading" of the Establishment Clause would do nothing more than prohibit an official
church. I agree with Gey that the Establishment Clause means more than this, but I
would not be so bold as to claim that this broader reading is inherent in the text. It is an
indefensible leap, however, to choose a non-literal definition of "establishment" that
contradicts the literal meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, which "singles out" and
forbids laws that "prohibit" the exercise of religion. On the literal language of the Free
Exercise Clause, see McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at 1115-16.
144. See THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 216-17 (1986).
145. The fully symmetrical "formal neutrality" proposed by Professor Kurland and
recently embraced by Professor Tushnet escapes this criticism.
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Party, and issue government propaganda about improper private
habits such as smoking or teenage sex; but it may not identify itself
officially with Christianity, subsidize churches as such, or propagandize for religious views. This half of the Religion Clauses suits the
anti-accommodationists just fine. But when religion is singled out
for protection, this strikes them as terribly unfair. My position is that
the government must "single out" religion in both free exercise and
establishment contexts, with the goal of approximating a substantive neutrality in a religiously pluralistic culture. The anti-accommodationists seemingly take the position that the government must
never "advance" religion, but may inhibit, penalize, and punish it.
A second response by anti-accommodationists to the "textualist
trap" is to argue that, properly read, the Free Exercise Clause does
not "single out" religion. The purpose of the Clause, they say, is to
make clear that religious expression is part of the First Amendment's "broad protection [of] all forms of expression without regard to their religious nature."' 14 6 The Free Exercise Clause has "a
crucial role in First Amendment theory by expanding the concept of
expression beyond the purely political context." 147 But religion
is protected as speech, and nothing more. Free exercise protection
is strictly limited to "religious beliefs, verbal expression.., and the
symbolic representation of faith through religious iconography"subject always to "traditional time, place, and manner
' 48
regulation."'
One need look no further than the Constitution's use of the term
'"exercise" to appreciate the implausibility of an interpretation that
would confine the Clause to speech and belief.' 49 Even the modern
146. Gey, supra note 122, at 149.
147. Id Ironically, though Gey asserts that it "contradicts" the view, which he attributes to Robert Bork, "that the first amendment protects only a narrow range of mainstream political expression," id. at 182, this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
actually confirms that position. If the Free Exercise Clause was necessary ("crucial," in
Gey's estimation) to "expand[] the concept of expression beyond the purely political
context," then without the Free Exercise Clause the First Amendment must not have
extended to the nonpolitical. An implication of Gey's anti-accommodationist interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, then, is that there exists no First Amendment protection for nonpolitical, nonreligious expression-including art and science. If the First

Amendment already extended to the nonpolitical, then the Free Exercise Clause would
be redundant.
148. Id. at 181; see also William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1983).
149. On the definition of "exercise" in contemporary dictionaries, see McConnell,
Origins, supra note 17, at 1489. Gey attempts to ground his interpretation in the drafting
history of the Free Exercise Clause, specifically the early drafts that referred to "rights of
conscience" rather than "free exercise of religion." Gey, supra note 122, at 149-50. He
does not point out that the House and Senate voted repeatedly on drafts presenting the
choice between these phrases (at one point using them both, which strongly suggests
that they were not seen as redundant), eventually settling on "free exercise of religion."
McConnell, Orgins, supra note 17, at 1481-82, 1488-1500. It is untenable to base an
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Supreme Court, which has adopted an extraordinarily narrow view
of free exercise, has unanimously rejected that reading.1 50 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was the principal precursor to the
First Amendment, began: "That religion, or the duty which we owe
to our CREATOR, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed
only be reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion." 15 1
Unless the duties we owe to our Creator are confined to speech and
belief, this demonstrates that "free exercise of religion" was understood to extend beyond the rights of expression.
But if First Amendment protections for religion extend beyond
speech and belief, to "exercise," then the anti-accommodationist
construction of the Amendment collapses. It is not credible to argue that accommodation of religion violates the First Amendment
on the ground that it protects religion and not other institutions and
systems of belief, because the same argument could be made against
the First Amendment itself.
The final point to be made against the claim that accommodations
"favor religion" because they protect religious but not nonreligious
objections is that this is not necessarily true. Accommodation of
religion must not be viewed in isolation, as if no other personal interests of the citizens receive protection from otherwise applicable
laws. To hold that accommodation of religion is unconstitutional is
to hold that the government must refuse to accommodate, even if it
would accommodate a secular concern of comparable strength.
Consider an example posited by Professor Steven Gey: the case
of a female student whose religion does not permit her to bare her
legs in public, but is compelled to attend gym class, where for "aesthetic" reasons the students are required to wear shorts. 52 Gey
does not identify the hypothetical student's religious belief, but it
resembles that of many traditional Hindus and Moslems. Although
recognizing that allowing the student to wear alternative dress
"would not 'coerce, compromise, nor influence the religious beliefs
of any school children,' "153 Gey maintains that this accommodation
interpretation on the rejected phrase rather than the one that was adopted. For an interpretation of the drafting history that leads to the opposite conclusion, see supra note

25.
150. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("[T]he 'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention
from) physical acts."); see also id. at 893 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("[Tihe First Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct."); id. at 909
(Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (joining this part of O'Connor's
opinion). If applied unflinchingly, Professor Gey's interpretation would allow the government to discriminate against religion, so long as the laws pertained to conduct rather
than speech.
151. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 16 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONsTrrTUON 70 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
152. Gey, supra note 122, at 182. Gey attributes the example to Dean Jesse Choper,
who in turn drew the example from a case that arose in Alabama.
153. Id. (quoting Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. PrTr. L. REV. 673, 689 (1980)).
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"would not be permissible."' 5 4 "By ceding authority over the objecting student to the higher religious authority," Gey states, "the
school board subjugates democratic control over
a particular policy
15 5
area to a nondemocratic, extra-human force."'
What are we to make of this argument? One can only presume
that a reasonable school board would accommodate a student who
had equally powerful secular claims for accommodation (though the
Free Exercise Clause would not requireit). To say that the board may
not accommodate the objection if it is grounded in religious belief
means that religion is given least-protected status. But what if the
school board has refused to accommodate secular objections to the
gym uniform? It does not necessarily follow that the board would
refuse to accommodate all secular objections, no matter how strong
they may be. The "governmental interest test" is the means by
which we can evaluate these counterfactual cases. If the government has a "compelling" (perhaps even a "substantial") interest in
enforcing the rule, then we can assume that secular interest would
be overridden. (That is what we mean when we say that the government's interests are "compelling.") But if the government's interests are not particularly strong, as in this case, there is every reason
to believe that some secular beliefs, if held with anything like the
strength of the religious example, would be accommodated.
The example thus helps to explain why accommodation is permitted, and also why it is sometimes required. If there were a Hindu or
Moslem majority in the community, the uniform would have a different design, and all the students would, in effect, conform to the
Hindu and Moslem mores (unless they had other constitutionally
cognizable objections). Indeed, a modest uniform would probably
be viewed as "natural" or "traditional," and not religious at all. Because there is neither a Hindu nor a Moslem majority, and because
the majority's view of aesthetics and convenience favors the wearing
of shorts, those who have different mores (whether religious or secular) pose a problem for the officials with control over the program.
The ordinary checks of the political process are fair guarantees that
government officials will ordinarily exercise reasonable judgement
and will not mindlessly subject their young citizens to oppressive
rules. Accommodations will probably be made. But the peculiar
circumstances of minority religions and the danger of religious majoritarianism make it necessary to buttress the political checks with
constitutional protections when the objection is based on adherence
to religion (which, given the majoritarian character of the rule, will
virtually always be a minority religion). The only reason I can think
154. Id.
155. Id. at 183.

1992]

of that school officials might deny the student's request for accommodation is that they are hostile to Hinduism or Islam, or (less
likely, but still possible) to religion in general, or to any religion that
deviates from the society's norm of conduct. That is what the Religion Clauses are designed to prevent. The claim that the Religion
Clauses require accommodation seems perfectly consistent with the
general constitutional commitment to the protection of minority
rights; the claim that the Religion Clauses outlaw accommodation of
this sort is both normatively and doctrinally wrong. What legitimate
interest of the state is served by requiring a Moslem or Hindu girl to
violate the tenets of her faith?
B.

The Argument That Accommodations May Be Made by Courts but Not
Legislatures

Some commentators argue that courts can impose exceptions to
formally neutral laws of general applicability under appropriate circumstances, pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, but that the political branches are strictly forbidden to do so. In other words, the
Establishment Clause forbids any accommodation that the Free Exercise Clause does not require. Professor Ira Lupu is the leading
exponent of this position.' 56 His position raises questions regarding the institutional competence of the political and judicial
branches of government, as well as of practical consequence for
Religion Clause doctrine.
1. InstitutionalCompetence
Professor Lupu's argument that courts are the only decisionmakers authorized to require accommodations of religion is
based on two premises. First, he argues that, for a variety of reasons, courts are likely to be more principled and even-handed than
political bodies. Confining the authority to accommodate religion
to the courts thus reduces the danger of unequal treatment of unpopular or unfamiliar religious groups.' 57 Second, he argues that,
insofar as accommodation is implemented at the state and local
level, it will result in "a nonuniform pattern of special treatment for
religions dominant in particular states," aggravating the dangers of
inequality.15 8 Lupu would not allow legislatures to enact accommodations even when they believe an accommodation is constitutionally compelled, and he has qualms about allowing legislatures to
enact accommodations in response to an actual judicial decision that
the accommodation is required. 159
This conception of judicial exclusivity in the enforcement of the
Constitution is utterly foreign to our legal system. The commands
of the Constitution are addressed to all persons exercising authority
under it; that is why our senators and representatives, and executive
156.
157.
158.
159.
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as well as judicial officers, at both the state and the federal level, are
required to take an oath to support the Constitution. 60 Judicial
review is not even mentioned in the Constitution. The First Amendment applies to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment; 161 Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment vests the
authority to enforce that Amendment in the Congress. 1 6 2 I cannot
fathom on what theory Professor Lupu contends that legislators and
executive officers are forbidden to conform their acts to constitutional
requirements.
The institutional strengths of the judiciary to which Professor
Lupu refers are real (even if somewhat exaggerated). It may be true
that courts are more likely to reach principled decisions and less
likely to discriminate in favor of mainstream faiths.' 6 3 It surely is
true that there would be greater uniformity if federal courts made all
the decisions. But this is equally true of many other issues of constitutional dimension. For example, racial discrimination-both
against minorities and on their behalf-is a knotty problem, entailing great risk of unprincipled and racist decisionmaking. For all the
reasons Lupu rehearses, courts might well be the best decisionmakers. But no one would contend that Congress should have
been kept from passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or that states
and localities should be barred from enacting local codes and ordinances forbidding discrimination. Indeed, in the especially sensitive
area of affirmative action, the prevailing view is that Congress-pursuant to its section five authority-has broad latitude to engage in
affirmative action, even though the courts' authority to do so is limited to circumstances in which affirmative action is a narrowly tailored remedy for a specific constitutional violation. 164
Legislative discretion in other areas of constitutional concern is
not confined to the bare requirements of the Constitution. The
political branches are entitled, within their delegated authority, to
secure the blessings of liberty and promote the values of the Bill of
Rights in ways that go beyond what courts could require. Why
should the free exercise of religion be an exception? Of course, the
substantive scope of permissible accommodation is limited by the
Establishment Clause (just as the scope of permissible affirmative
action is limited by the Equal Protection Clause). But the Establishment Clause limits the type of action all branches of government
160. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
161.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
163. As noted infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text, however, there is reason to
doubt that legislative accommodations are as discriminatory as Lupu suspects.
164. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-75, 491 (1980); see also id. at 510, 515 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517-20 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).

162. U.S.
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may take; it provides no warrant for the proposition that courts may
accommodate while legislatures cannot.
2. PracticalConsequences
The position that the First Amendment compels some judiciallycreated exemptions but forbids legislative accommodations, is normatively superior to the view that all accommodations are forbidden-provided that the prevailing interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause is hospitable to accommodations. Under pre-Smith
doctrine, judicial accomodations would protect the most powerful
and pressing claims, leaving unprotected only those religious practices where the burden is less clear, where the government interest
is apparently strong, or where the obstacle to the exercise of religion derives from private sources. The main effect would be to
force religious freedom litigants to go to court and to obtain relief
piecemeal, which many of them cannot afford. It is hard to see any
practical advantage to this (except to the litigation bar), but it is better than no accommodation at all.
Under the current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,
however, this position is indistinguishable from the position that
all accommodations are unconstitutional. Under Smith, accommodations are not constitutionally required. Under the judicial exclusivity position, any accommodations not required by the
Constitution are unconstitutional. Ergo, all accommodations are
unconstitutional.
Professor Lupu's own version (because he rejects Smith in some
contexts) would allow some accommodation for religiously motivated individuals, but would forbid accommodation of religious institutions. 16 5 For example, he contends that courts and the EEOC
should have the same power to oversee the selection of clergy that
they have under the employment discrimination laws to oversee the
selection of ordinary workers; churches should be forced to hire women, homosexuals, or unbelievers as priests and ministers, even if
they have ecclesiastical principles to the contrary.1 66 This position
strikes me as exceedingly odd. Exemption of religious institutions
from intrusive regulation presents the strongest, not the weakest,
claim for accommodation because the integrity of the religious community-its ability to determine its own structure, doctrine, membership, and leadership-is generally prerequisite to individual
faith, and because such matters rarely, if ever, affect outsiders to the
religion.
Professor Lupu's explanation for confining free exercise accommodations to noninstitutional claims betrays a highly individualistic
conception of religion. He maintains that "large, bureaucratized
religious organizations" present problems of "agency costs (who
165. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987).
166. See id. at 437-38.
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speaks for whom), good faith, financial self-interest, and threats to
social cohesion" so serious that they should be denied the right to
invoke the Free Exercise Clause. 1 6 7 He believes that the state
should intervene to protect religious believers from the power of
their chosen religious denominations, because it is "highly questionable" to think that self-sacrificing demands of organized religion, taught to "subjugated group members ... from early ages as
natural and divinely inspired" have received the genuine assent of
the members. 168 I think Lupu is wrong on both scores. Whether
religious organizations accurately reflect the beliefs of their members and whether members are "subjugated" or brainwashed by
early-childhood propaganda are matters for the believers and their
religious communities to decide, without government help. If the
constitutional protections for free exercise are not extended to the
institutional manifestations of religious practice, a great deal of what
adherents deem to be valuable about religion will be lost. 16 9
It is possible that the opposite of Lupu's position will be adopted:
that some degree of constitutional protection for institutional autonomy will be retained (perhaps under the Establishment Clause),
even though individual free exercise is left to the mercy of the state.
The Smith opinion approvingly cites the line of cases in which the
Court held that government must defer to religious authorities in
internal church property disputes-a potentially wide-ranging jurisprudence based as much on establishment as on free exercise principles. 170 Smith also cites a decision suggesting that churches retain
the power to set their own membership criteria.'17 It is difficult to
see why these decisions would survive Smith unless the Court senses
that institutional claims stand on a different footing than individual
claims.
The relation between the free exercise and establishment provisions might be reconceptualized as follows. Instead of treating free
167. Lupu, supra note 6, at 774.
168. Id. at 751 n.31.
169. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 19 (arguing for greater recognition of the asso-

ciational and institutional dimensions of free exercise); accord MichaelJ. Sandel, Freedom
of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 87 (James D. Hunter
& Os Guinness eds., 1990).
170. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969);
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119 (1952)). On the expansive
potential of these decisions, see Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental
Interference with Religious Organizations,41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and
the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
171. Smith, 494 U.S. at 482 (citing Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984)).

1992]

725

exercise as the clause under which to challenge burdens on religious
exercise and establishment as the clause under which to challenge
promotion or preference for religion, free exercise could be seen as
the protection for individual religious autonomy and establishment
as the provision governing the institutional relations between church
and state. The value animating the first would be something like
formal neutrality (under Smith), and the value animating the second
would be something like separation. Institutional exemptions promote the value of separation as well as that of religious liberty: they
reduce the degree of interaction and friction between officers of the
state and the institutions of the church. 17 2 This has been an important element in religious freedom in the West for some nine hundred years. 173

In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 174 the Supreme Court

recognized that the same considerations of "entanglement" that
have informed Establishment Clause decisions striking down aid to
parochial schools also militate against government regulation that
would intrude deeply into the internal governance of religious institutions. One of the consequences of Smith may be to spark interest
in a new conception of "separationism"-one designed to protect
religious association from government control rather than to elimi175
nate religion from public life.
C.

The Argument That Accommodations Are Permitted but Not Required

The most common anti-accommodationist position is the narrowest: that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel accommodations
but (within appropriate limits) the Establishment Clause permits
them. This position now commands a majority on the Supreme
Court. 1 76 Interestingly, the academic defenders of this position al-

most invariably state that they reject the reasoning, though not the
result, of the Supreme Court's decision. 177 Professor Marshall, for
example, writes: "The Smith opinion itself, however, cannot be
readily defended. The decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor
well-crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction....
My task is then to defend Smith's [result] without defending Smith
itself."' 178 Elsewhere I have analyzed and criticized the reasoning of
the Court in Smith. 179 Here, I will address each of the major arguments made by scholarly opponents of free exercise exemptions.
172. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17.
173. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLurION: THE FORMATION OF THE

WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983) (identifying the struggle for the independence of the
institutional church in the late eleventh century as one of the most significant developments in the Western legal tradition).

174. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
175. See Stephen D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular'" Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REV. 955 (1989).
176. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 120, at 308-09; West, supra note 30, at 600-13.
178. Marshall, supra note 120, at 308-09.
179. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17.
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1.

Religious Accommodations Constitute a "Benefit" to Religion

The most frequent argument against religious accommodations is
that they "constitute[] special or favored treatment for . . . religion." 180 Professor West argues that "granting exemptions as constitutional rights violates the principle of neutrality toward
religion."' 1 8 1 Professor William Marshall calls accommodations "favoritism for religious beliefs over other beliefs."' 8 2 This should
sound familiar. It is the same argument made by those who contend
18 3
that accommodations are forbidden by the Establishment Clause.
I have already shown the fallacy in the argument: it rests either on
the false claim that all accommodations are an affirmative inducement or subsidy for religion, or on the argument that special constitutional protection for free exercise violates the Establishment
Clause-a patent misconstruction of the First Amendment.
This time, however, the argument is not that accommodations are
unconstitutional. West states that his "is not an argument against
all religion-based exemptions, including those granted by legislatures as privileges."' 1 84 Indeed, he explains, "to show that no religion-based exemptions are required by the Constitution is not to
show that all such exemptions are prohibitedby the Constitution." 18 5
This is true-but to show that accommodations are not required on
the ground that they violate the principle of neutrality is to show that they
are, in fact, prohibited. If accommodations are preferences, and the
Establishment Clause prohibits preference, it must follow that accommodations are not only not required, but forbidden.
West's argument that accommodations are not required thus contradicts his argument that legislative accommodations are permitted. In an attempt to escape this contradiction, West notes that the
founders "were willing to condone some religion-based exemptions
granted by legislatures." ' 186 He calls this fact "puzzling," but calmly
observes: "Nevertheless, it is a fact, and it allows the Supreme
Court to uphold some legislature-granted exemptions on the basis
of their 'unique history,' just as it did in upholding prayers in legislatures by paid chaplains."' 18 7 This explanation is patently inadequate. 188 A better explanation is that the Founders did not agree
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

West, supra note 30, at 600.
Id.
Marshall, supra note 120, at 320.
See supra text accompanying note 145.
West, supra note 30, at 634.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
It was also an inadequate explanation in the case of legislative chaplains. See

Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73

CORNELL

L. REV. 359, 362-63

(1988).
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with West that accommodations violate the principle of neutrality.
West also states that because
legislatures are always crafting exemptions from laws for categories of persons, groups, or businesses that might be unduly
harmed... by having to conform to those laws.... The principle
of neutrality or fairness would suggest that religious entities that
might suffer special but significant hardship should also be allowed to receive such exemptions. 18 9
West fails to note that a similar argument can be made for constitutionally compelled accommodations: because legislatures are "always crafting" accommodations for secular groups and politically
influential religious groups, it is necessary for courts to do so for
minority religious groups whenever they would be "unduly
harmed" by enforcement of the law, if we are to avoid discrimination against them. The Free Exercise Clause serves as a backdrop to
guarantee "fairness" to religious minorities when the political process fails.
Professor Marshall's argument against constitutionally compelled
accommodations contains the same contradiction. On the one
hand, he argues that "[t]he free exercise exemption.., offends Establishment Clause principles."' 190 On the other hand, he states
that "statutory exemptions" do not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. 9 1 A "conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause does
not require a particular result does not mean that the Establishment
Clause necessarily prohibits that result."' 19 2 This argument is true,
but if the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the result, the alleged offense to "Establishment Clause principles" cannot be used
as an argument against the accommodationist interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. Marshall's attempt to resolve the contradiction is no more persuasive than West's. 193 Marshall asserts that
"[1limited statutory exemptions . . . do not necessarily send th[e]

forbidden message [of endorsement of religion]."' 9 4 He does not
explain why "limited constitutional exemptions" would be any
different. 9 5
Marshall offers one additional argument: that statutory exemptions are subject to "stringent constitutional review," in contrast to
constitutional exemptions, which are "presumptively valid."' 196 This
argument implies that courts do not trouble to assure themselves
that the remedies they impose are constitutional. This simply is not
189. West, supra note 30, at 635.
190. Marshall, supra note 120, at 320.
191. Id. at 323.
192. Id.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 184-189.
194. Marshall, supra note 120, at 323.
195. Another critic of accommodations, Professor Tushnet, argues the opposite. He
says that "[p]recisely because accommodation statutes are accommodations of religion,
they necessarily 'send a message' that exercises of religion are approved." Tushnet,
supra note 122, at 1703.
196. Marshall, supra note 120, at 324.
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the case.197 If anything, one would expect courts to be particularly
circumspect about imposing remedies that come close to being constitutional violations.
In any event, the supposed "benefits" to religion from an accommodationist interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause are balanced
by the "disadvantages to religion from the Establishment Clause.
When dealing with religion, government must refrain from action
that inhibits the activity (without sufficient justification), and it must
also refrain from action that induces the activity (without sufficient
justification). Some believe that a constitutional regime of substantive neutrality toward religion promotes religion; 198 others conclude
that this regime is hostile to religion. 19 9 I think it more accurate
simply to say that the lawful scope of government authority to influence the religious life of the people is constrained strictly.
In the end, these attacks on religious accommodation are simply a
play on ambiguous words like "benefit" and "neutrality." As Professor Douglas Laycock has persuasively shown, there are at least
three quite different senses in which the concept of "neutrality" is
commonly used in interpreting the First Amendment. 20 0 Religious
accommodations violate one of these conceptions of neutrality:
"formal neutrality." They do not violate-indeed, they are in many
cases required by-another conception of neutrality, which Professor Laycock labels "substantive neutrality."' 20 ' The serious question
is which conception of neutrality best comports with the purposes of
the First Amendment. It cannot be resolved by a naive invocation of
"neutrality" as if it were obvious that formal neutrality is the only
conception of the term.
2. Adoption of the Accommodationist Interpretation Would Eviscerate
the Establishment Clause
A related argument made by some opponents of religious accommodation is that adoption of the accommodationist position would
force a radical revision and devaluation of the Establishment Clause.
Professor Lupu, for example, contends that my accommodationist
197. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 409 (1963).

198. Gey, supra note 122.
199. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern
America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOwA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (reviewing
MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER:

CAN

THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERI-

POLITICS (1991)).

200. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).

201. Id. at 1003.
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position rests on a "weak or underdeveloped account of the Establishment Clause." 20 2 Accommodationists, he says, are "reluctant"
to give the Establishment Clause "its due. ' 20 3 The charge is
misplaced.
To begin with, it is not true that proponents of accommodation
always or necessarily take a "weaker" view of the Establishment
Clause, or that opponents of accommodation take a "stronger"
view. Among the institutional proponents of legislation that would
overturn the Smith decision and restore an accommodationist construction to the Free Exercise Clause are the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, and People for the American
Way-all of which are well known for taking an expansive view of
establishment. By the same token, most leading academic opponents of the accommodationist interpretation of free exercise-Ellis
West, Bill Marshall, Michael Malbin, and Walter Berns, and to some
extent Mark Tushnet and Phil Kurland-have advocated interpretations of the Establishment Clause less expansive than the Supreme
Court's.2 0 4 The leading advocates of free exercise exemptions on

the Supreme Court in recent years (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) are also the leading advocates of a "strong" Establishment Clause, while the opponents of free exercise exemptions (except for Justice Stevens) also tend to advocate a less expansive
conception of establishment.2 0 5 Given this mix of opinions, it is evident that free exercise accommodationism does not necessarily imply a devaluation of establishment principles.
Moreover, the claim that accommodationism devalues the Establishment Clause depends on the claim that accommodations are a
special benefit to religion. For reasons already discussed, 20 6 that
claim is not warranted. If accommodations were a special benefit, I
would agree that acceptance of accommodations would require radical revision in the Establishment Clause. But it makes more sense to
see the two Religion Clauses as complementary and symmetrical
202. Lupu, supra note 6, at 748.

203. Id.

204. Kurland and Tushnet would expand establishment doctrine in some respects
and contract it in others-allowing more nondiscriminatory financial assistance but
fewer exemptions from intrusive regulation. Lupu's own self-description as an advocate
of "Strong Establishment Clause, Strong Free Exercise Clause," Lupu, supra note 6, at
780, will raise questioning eyebrows in most circles. Lupu favors a much greater latitude for financial aid to religious institutions than has been permitted under Lemon, see
Lupu, supra note 5, and the extent of free exercise protection under his proposed approach is exceedingly limited. See Lupu, supra note 165.
205. Thus, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, who dissented in Smith, were
dissenters in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), and in the majority in Augilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Kennedy, who were in the majority in Smith, were in the majority in Kendrick and (except
for Scalia and Kennedy, who were not yet on the Court) dissented in Augilar. OnlyJustice Stevens was in the majority in Smith, the majority in Augilar, and the dissent in
Kendrick.
206. See supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
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propositions, protecting the autonomy of religious life against government inhibition as well as inducement. I do not see this construction as "weakening" the Establishment Clause.
Most accommodations in the institutional context further the separationist values of the Establishment Clause as well as the religious
liberty values of the Free Exercise Clause. The typical case involves
a government regulation that intrudes into the decisionmaking autonomy of the church. The leading example is Corporationof the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos. 207
In Amos the Court held that the government could exempt religious
institutions from the religious antidiscrimination requirements of
Title VII, thereby allowing them to favor members of their own faith
in hiring for positions in noncommercial activities of the church. If
it were not for the accommodation, the government would become
deeply entangled with religiously sensitive church decisions. The
government would have to determine why a church fired or refused
to hire a particular person, which would entail discovery into internal church governance, and it would have to determine whether the
particular function is one for which religious affinity is a legitimatequalification, which would entail second-guessing the church's understanding of its religious mission. There is a strong argument
that invasive and entangling regulation of this sort violates the Establishment Clause.2 08 To exempt religious institutions from some
forms of regulation protects the separation of church and state. In
this sense, institutional religious accommodation strongly rein20 9
forces, and may be required by, the Establishment Clause.
The charge that the accommodationist interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause will eviscerate the Establishment Clause has a certain irony. In several important respects, the accommodationist interpretation of free exercise is doctrinally more compatible with a
207. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Amos is discussed supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
208. See Esbeck, supra note 170, at 348.
209. Amos is a much misunderstood decision. One scholar has described the case as
"favor[ing] free exercise in the form of the theological integrity of religious organizations over free exercise in the form of personal freedom of conscience and belief." Gey,
supra note 122, at 92. But, an employee of a church has no "free exercise" rights
against the church; the Free Exercise Clause runs only against the government, not
against private parties. The Amos decision favored the free exercise right against governmental interference over a statutory right to nondiscrimination. Another scholar has
described Amos as "prefer[ring] religion to their non-religious counterparts." Lupu,
supra note 6, at 768 & n. 121. But Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis
of secular ideology; secular, ideological organizations are permitted to discriminate in
favor of their adherents. The Sierra Club can hire only environmentalists if it chooses.
Though in form the exemption upheld in Amos was religion-specific, in effect it merely
placed religious organizations on the same plane as their nonreligious counterparts.
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vigorous Establishment Clause than is its principal competitor, reflected in Smith. 21 0 First, the impetus behind the Smith opinion was
less the proper relation between religion and government than it
was the proper relation between the courts and the political
branches. Smith is a major step toward increased judicial deference
to the political branches in the area of religion. The logical corollary to Smith on the establishment side is to increase the deference
to the political branches. The accommodationist position on the
Free Exercise Clause is more consistent with a strong, continued
judicial role.
Second, both the accommodationist position on free exercise and
the "strong" interpretations of the Establishment Clause insist
that-at least in some contexts-the government must treat religion
differently from other activities and ideologies. The logical corollary to abandoning that position in Smith is to abandon it for establishment purposes as well, which would mean that government
support and endorsement of religion would be treated in much the
same way as government support and endorsement of other activities and ideologies. Needless to say, this would constitute a major
departure from Establishment Clause principles. In a world in
which the police powers of the state have extended to permit the
support or regulation of virtually any activity in the private sphere,
the separation of church and state requires a sharp distinction between "church" and anything else.
Third, the accommodationist position employs an "effects test"
under the Free Exercise Clause, while Smith holds that only facial or
intentional discrimination against religion is unconstitutional. The
logical corollary for the Establishment Clause would be to dispense
2 11
with the effects and entanglement tests under Lemon v. Kurtzman,
making only laws with a religious purpose vulnerable to Establishment Clause challenges. This would be a more restrictive position
than any Justice or commentator has ever suggested.
Far from threatening Establishment Clause principles, therefore,
the accommodationist position strengthens those principles against
the much more serious danger posed by the competing position of
deference to majoritarian decisionmaking affecting religion. It is
true that accommodation is inconsistent with the hypertrophic understandings of establishment that have animated secularists and
their allies for so many years-but that would be true of any serious
recognition of free exercise principles. Unlike the formal neutrality
position, accommodation seeks to maintain the independence of
religious life from government influence and control. That position
simply cannot be described as favoring the establishment of
religion.
210. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
211. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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3. Accommodations May FavorMainstream Religions over
Nonmainstream Religions
Some commentators have argued that religious accommodations
are inconsistent with the principle of denominational neutralitywhat Professor Lupu has helpfully termed the principle of "equal
religious liberty."2 1 2 They say that judicially mandated accommodations tend to protect mainstream religions and not to protect religious faiths that seem unfamiliar or bizarre. Professor Mark
Tushnet, for example, contends that those administering religious
accommodations are inherently more likely to find that religious
claims that seem "familiar"-that is, similar to "the kinds of worship
that the Justices of the Supreme Court are accustomed to'-are sincere and therefore protected than they are the claims of "non-mainstream denominations, sects, and cults. '2 1 3 As a preliminary point,
I doubt the accuracy of this assessment. The one empirical study of
212. Lupu, supra note 5, at 580 (emphasis added). Professor Lupu criticizes my statement in an earlier work that "religious liberty is the central value and animating purpose
of the Religion Clauses" on the ground that this neglects the principle of equal religious
liberty. Id. at 567 (quoting McConnell, supra note 14, at 1); see also id. at 580 (arguing
that "accommodationists like Professor McConnell cannot blithely ignore the need for
some strong version of an equality principle in this field"). For the record, I have consistently maintained that the First Amendment requires an equality of religious liberty.
See McConnell, supra note 14, at 39; McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at
1130-32. Contrary to Professor Lupu's argument that "[t]he principle of religious liberty taken alone is insufficient to fully justify an antidiscrimination principle," Lupu,
supra note 5, at 567, I would contend that nondiscrimination is an indispensable element
in a regime of religious liberty. If the government confers benefits to one religion and
not another, the religious decisions of the people will be distorted. Fundamental to my
understanding of religious liberty is that the government should (within the constraints
imposed by the necessities of public policy) create neither incentives nor disincentives to
religious practice. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 60, at 37-38. Far from
"ignor[ing]" the need for an equality principle in this field, I have based my arguments
in favor of accommodation, in significant part, on the proposition that accommodations
are necessary for the protection of "the full and equal rights of conscience," McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at 1133-36, and in favor of constitutionally compelled accommodations on the proposition that, in light of legislative selectivity, "the
only hope for achieving denominational neutrality is a vigorous Free Exercise Clause,"
id. at 1132.
213. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 382-83; see also Lupu, supra note 5, at 586-87. Tushnet
also points to what he calls the "troubling" pattern of Supreme Court free-exercise
ases in which, "put bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes Christians win but non-Christians never do." Tushnet, supra note 44, at 381. I think Professor Tushnet is a bit paranoid here. No one has won a free-exercise accomodation case in 20 years, except for
disappointed unemployment compensation claimants. One of the winners was a Jehovah's Witness, which is a decidedly non-mainstream group. Interestingly, Professor
Kurland, whose position Professor Tushnet has adopted, argues that smaller religions
have a greater likelihood of winning free-exercise exemptions than larger religions-the
opposite of Professor Tushnet's opinion. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 243
(1973).
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free exercise cases of which I am aware found that "marginal" religions benefitted more than "established" religions.2 1 4 It is true that
well-documented claims of long-standing groups are less likely to be
dismissed as insincere,2 1 5 but nonmainstream religious groups often
can produce extensive documentation of their beliefs.2 1 6 Indeed,
Protestant beliefs may get short shrift because their tradition of individual assessment of scripture sometimes makes it difficult to
demonstrate a denominational basis for their actions. 21 7 Of course,
truly mainstream religions have little need for accommodations at
all. Given their influence on the culture, it is unlikely that the laws
will conflict in any serious way with their deeply held principles.
More fundamentally, it does not follow from this argument-even
assuming its empirical validity-that First Amendment doctrine
should be interpreted to preclude free exercise accommodations.
Rather, the doctrine should be drawn in such a fashion as to protect
the rights of nonmainstream groups. Critics should not be complaining about Sherbert and Yoder; they should be complaining about
cases like Hernandez, in which the Court permitted denominational
discrimination.2 1 8 Moreover, concern about nonmainstream religions is properly an argument in favor of free exercise accommodations, and against the proposition that accommodations are
permitted but not required. Presumably, the political branches are
more likely than the courts to favor mainstream over nonmainstream religions. That is why the Court was forced to admit in Smith
that its ruling would "place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in." 2 19 The Free Exercise
Clause is needed as a backstop to legislative accommodations, to
ensure that fringe religious groups receive no less protection than is
afforded to familiar religions.
Again, the abstract quality of the argument against accommodation is apparent. In the real world, the most enthusiastic supporters
of free exercise accommodations, and the most outraged opponents
of Smith, are the members of and advocates for minority religious
214. Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77

AM. POL. Sci. REv. 652, 664-65 (1983).
215. See Tushnet, supra note 44, at 382.
216. For example, the Native American religious practices involved in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), were well documented by anthropological studies. Id. at 442. Lawyers for the Yoruba and Santeria
religious groups, whose animal sacrifices have been outlawed in Florida, traced those
practices back many centuries to West Africa. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 3-4,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(No. 90-5176). My sometime clients, the Hare Krishnas, who are not a mainstream
group, are able to show a history that goes back many thousands of years. Brief Amicus
Curiae of the World Hindu Assembly of North America at 2, International Soc'y of
Krishna Consciousness v. George, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991) (No. 89-1399). Sincerity was
thus successfully proven in Lyng, and essentially unquestioned in Lukumi and George.
217. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). In Mozert, the Sixth Circuit adopted a very narrow interpretation of the plaintiffs' asserted religious beliefs, contrary to both the factual findings
of the district court and the testimony of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1063-65.
218. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
219. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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sects. When lawyers for Muslims, gypsies, Rastafarians, Scientologists, Orthodox Jews, Amish, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the Native American Church begin to oppose religious exemptions on the ground that they discriminate against nonmainstream
religion, it may be time to take this argument more seriously.
4. Accommodations Require an Intrusive Investigation into the Content
and Sincerity of Religious Beliefs
Some commentators object to religious accommodations on the
ground that they require the government to decide what claims are
sincerely religious. As Professor Marshall explains, "exemption
analysis threatens free exercise values because it requires courts to
consider the legitimacy of the religious claim of the party seeking
the exemption." 220 This process "does more than simply limit religion; it places an official imprimatur on certain types of belief sys22 1
tems to the exclusion of others."
There is something to this argument, 22 2 but it is not a serious
enough objection to warrant elimination of religious accommodations. As a practical matter, sincerity has been an issue in only a
relative handful of cases. In part, this may be because of the selflimiting character of the accommodation doctrine. Because accommodations are designed to alleviate a burden, not to bestow a benefit, the incentives to feign religious belief are reduced-and it is
precisely the cases in which the incentives are strong that the government is most likely to be able to establish a compelling interest in
2 23
not having to make accommodations.
Moreover, it seems odd to say that because the courts might erroneously deny some claims it ought to reject them all. There is undoubtedly a measure of psychic injury to one whose deepest beliefs
are held to be insincere, and the court's ruling may have some symbolic effect on the community as a whole. But for the most part the
only consequence of an insensitive ruling on the sincerity issue is
that injustice is done in the particular case. Professor West claims
that the doctrinal judgments entailed by accommodations will entangle government with religion "in the worst sort of way." 224 This
220. Marshall, supra note 120, at 310; see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 953-60 (1989)
(discussing the components of a free exercise claim);John T. Noonan,Jr., How Sincere Do
You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 713; West, supra note 30, at 609-10
(examining the necessity of courts entangling themselves in judgments concerning religious beliefs in free exercise cases).
221. Marshall, supra note 120, at 310-11.
222. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17, at 154-55.
223. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 & n.3 (1982) (Stevens,J., concurring)
(expressing particular concern about accommodations that would create "an economic
motivation to join the favored sects").
224. West, supra note 30, at 609.
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assessment is abstract and artificial: to the free-exercise claimant,
the "worst sort of way" the government involves itself with religion
is to stand in the way of its exercise. To ignore the real effects on
religious exercise because of the symbolic effects of this kind of "entanglement" is an example of misplaced priorities.
It also bears mentioning that the problem of sincerity is no worse
with constitutionally compelled exemptions than with legislative exemptions. Those commentators, like Marshall and West, who claim
to support the legitimacy of legislative exemptions cannot consistently offer this as an argument against constitutional exemptions.
5. Free Exercise Accommodation Rights Cannot Be Administered Fairly
or Objectively by the Courts
The principal argument in Smith is that judges are institutionally
incapable of engaging in the balance between religious conscience
and the interests of the government that free exercise accommodations are said to require. Indeed, the Court described this process
as "horrible to contemplate." 225 Some commentators have seconded this concern. Ellis West, for example, maintains that "there is
no clear, workable, or fair way of limiting the number and kinds of
exemptions to be granted if persons had a recognized constitutional
right to disobey for religious reasons whatever laws they chose to
disobey." 226 West's choice of language, which is presumably not accidental, betrays the gulf of misunderstanding between those who
view religious scruples as a "choice" to "disobey" and those who
view religion as conformity to the dictates of an authority higher
than civil society. Jefferson, Madison, and the other Founders who
insisted on protecting "the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it" would not recognize West's trivialization of the dictates of conscience. 2 27 But putting aside the language,
this argument, too, carries considerable weight. As West points out,
the "courts in deciding who is eligible for exemptions will inevitably
make
decisions that
are arbitrary,
unpredictable,
and
2 28
discriminatory."
Unlike the previous arguments, this claim distinguishes between
constitutionally compelled and constitutionally permitted accommodations, at least to a degree. The most difficult aspect of the free
exercise balance is assessment of the weight that should be given to
enforcement of the government's policy, as applied to the religious
objector. Where the government has directed that claims of religious conscience should outweigh the government's interest, this
aspect of the adjudication is greatly eased. For example, it is relatively easy to administer a law that allows use of peyote in Native
225. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
226. West, supra note 30, at 604; see also Gey, supra note 122, at 185 (discussing inherent difficulties in exemption analysis); Marshall, supra note 120, at 310-12.
227. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 16 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONST10rrxoN, supra note 151, at 70.
228. West, supra note 30, at 605.
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American Church ceremonials. We know that the legislature deems
the detrimental impact of its policies of less weight than the injury to
conscience.
On the other hand, if the government enacts accommodation legislation in general terms (requiring religion to be "reasonably accommodate[d] ' ' 22 9 or accommodation in the absence of a
"compelling governmental interest" 23 0 ) the courts will have no
choice but to engage in the difficult process of balancing interests.
This indicates that the real distinction is not between constitutionally compelled accommodations and legislative accommodations,
but between those that are specific and those that are general.
I have argued elsewhere that some of the arbitrariness and unpredictability of the free exercise analysis can be reduced by applying a
more categorical approach to the cases, basing this argument on the
historical roots of the free exercise doctrine. 2 31 But assuming that
some degree ofjudicial discretion-and hence potential for arbitrariness-remains, as it will, the argument still seems but a weak reason
to scuttle the doctrine. As Professor Lupu has observed: "the assertion that judicially manageable standards are lacking here more
than in other areas of constitutional adjudication simply rings
false."' 2 32 For example, the courts have a terrible time determining
what a "reasonable" search and seizure is, and the results are not
always sensible or consistent; the negative commerce clause cases
are all over the map; the Supreme Court's "takings" jurisprudence
is a mess. Free exercise cases have been no worse than the restonly less favorable to the plaintiff. 23 3 It is worth remembering Justice Jackson's words in Barnette:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights . . .into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the
problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence.... These changed conditions often... cast us more than
we would choose upon our own judgment. But we act in these
matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our
commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our
competence in [particular fields], withhold the judgment that history authenticates
as the function of this Court when liberty is
234
infringed.
229. This is the language in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
230. This is the language in the proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act. H.R.
2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
231. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at 1144-49.
232. Lupu, supra note 6, at 760.
233. Professor Marshall makes the astonishing assertion that the free-exercise exemption process "necessarily leads to underestimating the strength of the countervailing state interest." Marshall, supra note 120, at 312. Has he not noticed that the
government almost invariably wins these cases?

234. West Virginia Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
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Moreover, it should not be assumed that problems of potential
arbitrariness exist only under the accommodationist interpretation.
To be sure, proponents of formal neutrality claim that theirs would
be a "rigid and easily applied test," 2 35 but this assertion is too optimistic. Professor Kurland, the originator of this approach, has admitted that formal neutrality does not eliminate the problem of
establishing sincerity, 23 6 though it may be an improvement. It is not
always easy to tell whether a given law is religiously neutral. Is
building a road through the holy places of the Yurok Indians of California formally neutral (because the decision was based on secular
considerations) or discriminatory (because no other religion would
be affected and it is hard to believe the road would be built if it had a
similar effect on a more powerful religious group)? 23 7 Is a ban on
the "ritual slaughter" of animals "neutral," as the City of Hialeah
argued, because it would apply to fraternity house antics as well as
to the Santeria religion? 23 8 Ironically, the formal neutrality test cannot even resolve the leading free exercise case in the Supreme
Court. On the facts of Sherbert v. Verner,23 9 would it be formally neutral for the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons unemployed for reasons of religious conviction, when others are given
benefits for unemployment caused or prolonged by some (but not
all) nonreligious personal factors, such as inappropriateness of the
work or distance from home? A theory that cannot supply an answer to the leading case in the field is somewhat lacking in ease of
application.
I have great sympathy for the view that legal principles should be
structured to avoid excessive judicial discretion, which can lead to
unprincipled results. But the proper approach is to design rules
that will produce the right answer most of the time. Clear rules are
of little value if they do not achieve the purpose of the constitutional
provision they are designed to illuminate.
6

The Constitution Privileges the Secular over the Religious

A final argument against accommodation of religion is that religious commitments-at least those most likely to give rise to claims
of accommodation-are inconsistent with the democratic order.
Although these commitments should not be suppressed, neither
should they be encouraged. Professor Lupu calls this the principle
of "secular advantage." 240 He sees religious accommodation as a
235. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 400.
236. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
63 (1961) (stating that determining sincerity "may be the insoluble problem under any
theory of the meaning of the first amendment religion clauses"). On the problem of
sincerity, see supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
237. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
238. Church of the Lukimi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (1 lth
Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion, available in LEXIS, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12925
(11 th Cir.June 11, 1991)), aff'g 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), cert. granted, No. 91948, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1707 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1992).
239. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
240. Lupu, supra note 5, at 596. Professor Kathleen Sullivan makes a similar plea for
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threat to "the project of constitutional democracy, which depends
upon a citizenry capable of exercising independent and critical judgment concerning policies and leaders. ' 24 1 "[Rieligious institutions
...frequently claim divine inspiration of their principles and leaders
as a basis of power and legitimacy. ' 242 "Such claims," Lupu says,
"discourage skepticism and make intense demands for obedience by
adherents. The Constitution requires toleration of such institutions, but it would be constitutional folly to read the Establishment
Clause to permit support and encouragement [for them]." 24 3 Such
institutions "undermine rather than mutually reinforce habits of
mind necessary for democratic decisionmaking." 2 44 In a similar
vein, Professor Gey states that religion is "fundamentally incompatible" with the "intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic
state," which is the realization that "there can be no sacrosanct principles or unquestioned truths. ' 245 Religions fail to inculcate the
"anti-authoritarian mindset" on which democracy depends.2 46 The
Establishment Clause, he says, "is itself a value choice in favor of
collective relativism and uncertainty about everlasting political
247
truth."
There is no way to know how much of the opposition to a vigorous Free Exercise Clause is attributable to sentiments of this sort.
privileging secular over religious world views, in the name of the "establishment of the
secular public moral order." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
Cm. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 8, on file with The George Washington Law
Review). From this premise, Sullivan draws the conclusion that "religious subcultures
[should be allowed] to withdraw from regulation insofar as compatible with peaceful
diarchic coexistence," id. (manuscript at 51), but should be denied the right to participate in public programs, id. Professor Lupu, by contrast, would deny any right of exemption from regulation, but would allow equal participation in public programs.
Lupu, supra note 5, at 594. Thus, from a common premise that religion is contrary to
the liberal democratic order, Sullivan and Lupu reach opposite positions on free exercise and establishment.
241. Lupu, supra note 5, at 597.
242. Idr
243. Id. at 597-98.
244. Id at 598.
245. Gey, supra note 122, at 174.
246. Id. Gey associates what he supposes to be my "Rightist political principles" with
political authoritarianism. Idrat 178. Curiously, Professor Sullivan, whose view of religion resembles Gey's, describes my position as that of"an erstwhile religious anarchist."
Sullivan, supra note 240 (manuscript at 46). While I prefer to think of myself as espousing a workable balance between republican government and individual rights, I would
admit that my position leans somewhat closer to anarchy than to authoritarianism. I
believe that our Constitution recognizes the legitimacy of a belief in powers higher than
the state. I believe, moreover, that judgments about the dictates of the higher power
can be made only by individuals and communities of believers, and not by the state. The
First Amendment, thus understood, undermines any claim by the state to ultimate normative authority. On the other hand, I believe that religion establishes a connection
between each individual believer and his fellow man, which helps to overcome the aggressive individualism that so threatens civil order. In this sense, religion is an antidote
for anarchy.
247. Gey, supra note 122, at 179.

1992]

739

They are rarely expressed. 248 Is it necessary to respond? Is it necessary to point out that the great attacks on the democratic ideal and
the most intense demands for obedience in this century have come
from those for whom no extraworldly source of decent limits exists?
Or that their prison camps were filled with brave individuals who
claimed divine inspiration for their adherence to principle? Is it not
obvious that intolerance and ideological blindness come in secular
as well as religious hues? That persons of varying faiths can be
equal citizens in a pluralistic republic? Indeed, that the wellsprings
of religious experience have made a certain contribution to the development of the democratic spirit?
The canard that the First Amendment was a deliberate "value
choice in favor of collective relativism" 24 9 is more often heard
among religious demagogues than among those who count themselves as supporters of our pluralistic constitutional order. Let
there be no doubt: The Establishment Clause was a deliberate
choice to allow all sects and modes of belief, religious as well as
secular, to compete for the allegiance of the people, without official
preference. The attempt to press the Religion Clauses into service
as an instrument for "collective relativism," or any other official orthodoxy, must be condemned in the strongest possible terms.
The view that religion "undermines" the democratic spirit certainly played no part in this country's adoption of the First Amendment. The Founders were far more likely to assume, as did
Washington, that religion is the "indispensable support[]" for republican government. 25 0 The reaction of the Founders to the subgroups among them whose religious convictions conflicted with the
needs of the civil order was not to accuse them of undemocratic tendencies, but to protect their sincere claims of conscience. It was at
the time of greatest national peril that the Continental Congress
passed this resolution:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to
their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their
distressed brethren in the several colonies, and to do all other
services to their oppressed Country,
which they can consistently
1
with their religious principles. 25
Tocqueville observed that the Americans of the early days of the
248. They were much more commonly articulated in the last half of the nineteenthcentury, though almost exclusively with reference to the Roman Catholic Church. See,
e.g., R. W. THOMPSON, THE PAPACY AND THE CIVIL POWER 695-716 (New York, Harper &
Brs. 1876).

249.
250.
1796),
251.
GRESS,

740

See Gey, supra note 122, at 179.
President George Washington, Washington's Farewell Address, (Sept. 17,
in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 169, 173 (Henry S. Commager ed., 1973).
Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON1774-1789, at 187, 189 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905).

[VOL. 60:685

McConnell
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Republic considered religion "necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions. ' 252 He had come to agree with them. "Despotism may be able to do without faith, but freedom cannot.
Religion is much more needed in the republic they advocate than in
the monarchy they attack, and in democratic republics most of
all."' 25 3 He said the French "pedants" find this "an obvious mistake" and believe that "freedom and human happiness" would be
advanced by the spread of secular Enlightenment ideas. "To that,"
Tocqueville responded, "I have really no answer to give, except that
those who talk like that have never been in America and have never
$2 54
seen either religious peoples or free ones.
Nor would the view that religion undermines democracy have received the support of more than a tiny segment of the population at
any point since then. It is the narrow ideological position of the
secular elite, and it can claim no democratic or constitutional warrant. It relegates the large majority of the American public, for
whom religion is the most important source of normative understanding, to second-class citizenship. 25 5 Some democracy.
I make no claim that religious positions should be privileged because they are religious, but only that secular positions should not
be privileged because they are secular. In a regime of popular sovereignty, the people should be free to draw their normative insights
from whatever sources they find convincing, without the government tipping the scales in one direction or another. The arguments
for and against accommodation should not rest on dubious presuppositions about the degree to which religion is indispensable to
democracy, as Washington and Tocqueville said, or undermines democracy, as Professors Lupu and Gey say. Ours is not a Christian
republic, but it is not a secular republic, either. It is a free and pluralistic republic, in which religious voices from a variety of traditions, along with nonreligious voices from other traditions, have an
equal right to speak and strive for their visions of justice.
Conclusion
The United States is fortunate that our debates over free exercise
of religion are confined to the alternatives of a ban on overt discrimination and a ban on laws that restrict the practice of religion without sufficient justification. Either position would be an
improvement over the law of almost all other nations during almost
the whole of history. Adoption of the formal neutrality standard of
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Smith does not mean that religious liberty in the United States is at
an end-though it does mean that the federal courts will cease to
play a large role in enforcing it. It is troubling that minority religions will be the ones to suffer, as the Smith majority conceded. The
Supreme Court has already sanctioned government action that, it
recognized, would "virtually destroy" one small religion.2 56 Others
may be similarly vulnerable. But the good news is that Congress
intervened and put an end to the threat that the Court had permitted. 25 7 Our tradition of respect for minority religious opinion is suf-

ficiently robust that a decline in judicial attention will probably not
2 58
have enormous consequences.
Adoption of the more extreme formal neutrality standard, under
which religious accommodations are unconstitutional as well as not
required, would cause far more serious problems. This standard
would force the legislatures to ignore religious objections to generally applicable laws, even when their own assessment is that accommodations would be practical and beneficial. Their only alternative
would be to forego legislation altogether, which is not always a practical or beneficial alternative. It seems to me exceedingly unlikely
that the Supreme Court will take this step, both because the consequences would be so horrific and because the current jurisprudence
ofjudicial restraint points the other way. It is logically unsatisfying,
however, for an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause to prevail
when the principal arguments in its support are such that, if applied
logically to the Establishment Clause, would be so obviously untenable. The goal of harmonizing the two Religion Clauses appears as
distant as ever.

256. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52
(1988).
257. HOUSE COMM'N ON APPROPRIATIONS, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 713, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988)
(defunding the road project at issue in Lyng).
258. A disturbing counterexample is the decision of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to rescind an exception from its hard-hat requirement for construction workers, which is repugnant to Amish and Sikhs. No Exemption From Hard Hat
Wear Based on High-Court Decision, OSHA Says, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1018 (Nov. 14,
1990) (discussing OSHA Notice CPL 2 (Nov. 5, 1990)). OSHA reasoned that because
the exemption is no longer required under Supreme Court precedent it could be eliminated. It did not appear to occur to OSHA that it might continue to protect religious
liberty even if not required to do so.
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